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INTERPRETATION AS STATECRAFT:
CHANCELLOR KENT AND THE COLLABORATIVE
ERA OF AMERICAN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
FARAH PETERSON
A fundamental institutional dilemma lies behind our debates over theories of statutory interpretation: what can judges do when lay legislatures, out
of ignorance, inattention, or democratic zeal, enact statutes that threaten the
working structure of specific areas of law or contravene deep-rooted rule of
law principles? During the first decades of the nineteenth century, the question of what a judge could do to rein in a runaway legislature was particularly
urgent because of the enormous amount of authority legislatures were given
under the first American constitutions. In an overreaction to colonials’ decades of experience with corrupt governors and judges who took their cues
from their masters in London, the first state constitutions gave legislatures
broad powers without practical limits. In many states, the legislative
branches actually controlled the judicial branches through appointment and
removal authority, the ability to change tenure length, and salary dependence.
It wasn’t long before many Americans regretted these original grants of authority.
Legislatures fell into popular disfavor after only a few years of incompetence and inconsistency, hated by both those who thought them too radical
and redistributionist and those who thought them too firmly under the sway
of the propertied few. As Jack Rakove observed, it took only “a decade of
experience under the state constitutions to expose . . . that the abuse of legislative power was more ominous than arbitrary acts of the executive” and “that
the true problem of rights was less to protect the ruled from their rulers than
to defend minorities and individuals against factious popular majorities acting through government.”1 Some of the problematic legislation of those early
days seemed to have been passed in bad faith, including ex post facto laws
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and takings of property in patent violation of state constitutions.2 But a lot
of bad legislation was the result of simple incompetence—statutes written so
confusingly they could not be executed, statutes that conflicted with each
other, and statutes that added rights, duties, and causes of action in piecemeal
fashion to preexisting laws. As a result, as Gordon S. Wood put it, Americans
began to have “serious second thoughts about their earlier confidence in their
popularly-elected legislatures and were beginning to reevaluate their former
hostility to judicial power and discretion.”3
The result was a moment of opportunity for the judiciary. The late
1790s through the early 1820s saw a high point in what contemporaries called
“equitable interpretation” of legislation—interpretation that allowed courts
to mold statutes in conformity with common law precedent and background
legal norms. When the problem of irresponsible legislation became central
to late eighteenth-century politics and constitution making, equitable interpretation was the jurisprudential response. This period of judicial collaboration in the legislative process represents an important stage in early American
legal development. It was a moment in which influential judges like James
Kent of New York wrote statutory interpretation opinions as equal partners
with their legislatures, rather than inhabiting the more expected (rhetorical)
roles judges claim for themselves today, either as legislatures’ mechanical
agents or dutiful disciplinarians.
Legal historians have paid little attention to statutes and statutory interpretation. The historiography is instead focused on the rise of a muscular
judiciary willing to use the common law to shape society. In the 1950s,
Willard Hurst thought up the paradigm that historians have been writing with
and against ever since—the idea that American judges began to prioritize the
“release of [productive] energy” over tried-and-true English precedent.4
Hurst’s thesis provides an organizing principle to explain American changes
to property, contract, and labor law, as well as the law of corporations. In the
1970s, Morton Horwitz, a historian in dialogue with Hurst, took it a bit further, arguing that American judges were not just displaying a new cultural
orientation toward their work, case-by-case (as Hurst’s description seemed
to suggest), but rather, that judges saw themselves as social engineers.5 Horwitz quoted common law cases in which precedent gave way to concerns
about economic efficiency and social welfare in order to show that “by 1820
2. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 409–
23 (1969).
3. Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Judicial Review Revisited, or How the Marshall Court
Made More out of Less, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 787, 791 (1999).
4. JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTHCENTURY UNITED STATES 3–32 (1956).
5. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, at 2
(1977).
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the process of common law decision making had taken on many of the qualities of legislation.”6
But in their focus on common law decision making, these historians
have emphasized power shifting. The basic idea is that judges muscled in on
legislative territory. This starts with the unexamined assumption that early
American legislative and judicial branches had the same clearly defined roles
as our modern institutions. What those historians did not discuss, and what
is more telling than developments in the common law, is not power shifting
between the legislative and judicial branches but power sharing, which is
what we find when we look at Chancellor Kent’s generation of judges and
their methods of statutory interpretation. In part because of those cultural
shifts that led to what Hurst called the “release of energy” in common law
jurisprudence, some nineteenth-century judges brought an aggressive new
approach to statutory interpretation. Indeed, the 1800s through 1820s saw
novel political and constitutional offices that formally blended what we
would think of as judicial and legislative responsibilities.
That is not to say that equitable interpretation has gone unnoticed. Legal
scholars have rediscovered equitable interpretation and debated its implications for modern theories of interpretation. Some members of the Legal Process School hailed what they saw as a model for their own era, finding in
equitable interpretation an example of how purpose-driven interpretation
could work within the American constitutional framework.7 But as this Article will discuss, while there is some resonance between the approach of the
Legal Process scholars and Kent’s generation, the practical and constitutional
differences between the America of the early nineteenth century and the
America of the twentieth limit the extent of those similarities.
More recently, Bill Eskridge rediscovered the use of equitable interpretation in the post-ratification decades and held it up as a challenge to the textualist doctrine of modern formalists, a group whose members also tend to
adhere to original meaning as a guide to jurisprudence.8 John Manning took

6. Id. Another historian in the same intellectual tradition explained,
the legislative responsibility of lawyers and judges for establishing a rule of law was far
more apparent than it [would be] in later years. It was as clear to laymen as it was to
lawyers that the nature of American institutions, whether economic, social, or political,
was largely to be determined by the judges.
Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Creative Period in the Law of Massachusetts, 69 PROC. MASS. HIST.
SOC’Y 232, 237 (1947–1950).
7. See, e.g., James McCauley Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL
ESSAYS 213, 214–18 (1934); see also Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395,
400–01 (1950).
8. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509, 1523–
24 (1998).
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up that challenge and argued that equitable interpretation was merely “a doctrinal artifact of an ancient English governmental structure, one that had
blended governmental powers” and that had not “translate[d] well into a U.S.
Constitution marked by separated powers.”9 After examining the “relatively
few federal statutory cases . . . [in] the early volumes of case reports,” Manning found it “safe to say that the equity of the statute never gained a secure
foothold.”10 Eskridge published a rejoinder, which read a wide range of early
American legal sources, including the ratification debates and John Marshall’s jurisprudence, to embrace diverse interpretive tools, including equitable interpretation and a more contextual, text-based analysis of statutes than
that approved by modern formalist doctrine.11
I believe that both scholars missed the point. Busy grappling with the
question of how early American judges reached across the divide between
the judicial branch and the legislative, they did not stop to consider how that
divide may have changed over the intervening two hundred years. Insofar as
Manning explains equitable interpretation as the product of an English system in which “legislative and judicial functions merged” in a way that “minimize[d] the distinction between legislative and judicial functions,”12 I show
that, instead of the break from this heritage he finds by examining a limited
set of purely federal sources, the mingling of legislative and judicial functions
continued in important state jurisdictions. Manning’s observations that the
federal Constitutional Convention rejected a Council of Revision, for example,13 and that the convention decided to “vest[] ultimate judicial authority in
an independent Supreme Court, rather than in the upper house of the legislature”14 seem less significant when one considers that legislative high courts
and councils of revision were not uncommon at the state level. The very
conditions, therefore, that Manning agrees make it “fairly easy to see why
[English] judges might also conceive of themselves as partners in making
statute law more coherent and just” obtained at the state level in America
during this formative period.15 Eskridge countered Manning with evidence

9. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8
(2001).
10. Id. at 9.
11. William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial Power”
in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 995–98 (2001).
12. Manning, supra note 9, at 44, 46.
13. Id. at 59 n.237.
14. Id. at 60.
15. Id. at 46. For that matter, this Article also calls into question Justice Scalia’s reliance on
Kent as an authoritative source for his formalist principles of interpretation. See ANTONIN SCALIA
& BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 295 (2012) (introducing a canon of construction by citing James Kent’s use of it, while explaining that Kent was “one
of the chief 19th-century expositors of American law”); see also id. at 252.
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that judges frequently used equitable interpretation, but Eskridge didn’t explore the more interesting question: what was a “judge” at that time? And
what did Americans expect judges to do? As I will show, the fact that an
early nineteenth-century judge used a particular methodology provides little
authority to the modern judge—who may occupy a very different office—to
behave the same way.
Furthermore, both Eskridge and Manning were looking for their evidence in the wrong place. There is, I think, very little the early federal reporters can teach us about the “original meaning” of judicial power. In a
sense, federal courts were not even “courts” for much of this time. Their
jurisdiction was tiny, and what jurisdiction they had was so freighted with
non-legal pressure that their decisions provide little helpful data for understanding the development of statutory interpretation as a legal, rather than
diplomatic, activity. Under their original 1789 Act,16 federal courts could
hear cases in admiralty and cases dealing with citizens of different states,
penalties and forfeitures under the laws of the United States, and the small
number of federal crimes. They could not even hear all cases arising under
the federal laws or Constitution. The Judiciary Act of 180117 both increased
the number of federal judges and expanded their jurisdiction, but outgoing
Federalists had passed that Act primarily to pack the courts with their own
appointees. The federal courts were thereby thrust into party politics and
confirmed as dangerous havens for a partisan philosophy that quickly waned
in influence. The Jeffersonians repealed the 1801 Act in 1802, and the federal courts’ jurisdiction shrank again. Federal courts subsequently gained
jurisdiction only in order to play highly unpopular and politically dangerous
roles. For example, they received jurisdiction under a temporary provision
after the War of 1812 so that federal tax collectors could remove their enforcement actions from state courts. They also gained jurisdiction under the
1832 Force Bill in order to allow for suits to enforce tariffs on secessionists
in South Carolina. Again, they received jurisdiction under the 1850 Fugitive
Slave Act to enforce slave owners’ property rights in the North. In other
words, lower federal courts’ most important roles were as outposts of a foreign and resented power or as sites of diplomacy for states with opposing
interests.
In short, if we want to know what Americans of the post-ratification era
expected of their judiciary, we have to look at the states. That is why, in an
Article that professes to discuss the most influential jurists of the first decades
of the nineteenth century, I do not cite Chief Justice John Marshall once. This
may seem strange if you believe, as Willard Hurst did, that “on the bench,
16. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1330–1360 (2016).
17. Judiciary Act of 1801, Ch. 4, §§ 1–7, 2 Stat. 89, 89–91 (repealed in 1802).
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Marshall alone” exerted “individual influence” over the direction of legal
change.18 Yet, looking at Marshall in the context of his time and not just as
the genius of the present day, one sees that his vision for the nation had fewer
and fewer adherents as his career went on. Justice Story kept his legacy alive,
but Marshall needed the Union army to confirm his legacy.19 A jurisprudence
that requires civil war to assert itself may have little value as a guide to the
legal culture of the Antebellum past. And, quite simply, if one is looking for
the history of statutory interpretation, Marshall’s Supreme Court is not where
the main action takes place. In his own time and for the generation that followed, James Kent’s jurisdiction was more important to American law than
John Marshall’s.
This Article concerns the first three decades of the nineteenth century
and shows state judges in power-sharing arrangements with their legislatures.
In the statutory interpretation cases I describe, judges work to incorporate
statutes into existing background common law norms and precedents in ways
that show a large degree of legislative power. Although these power-sharing
arrangements were short-lived, the brief marriage of these two types of lawmaking created a powerful tool for framing American jurisprudence. And a
review of how the great judges of the early nineteenth century saw their work
shows, in turn, that the hard boundaries between branches of government, so
central to the modern understanding of American constitutional structure, is
a newer concept than is generally believed. The place that these judges
claimed for themselves represents a lost world of republican governance—a
way that republicanism could have worked, and did work for a time, before
anything like the modern understanding of separation of powers achieved
dominance.
***
This Article focuses on New York, which went the furthest of the states
in blending branches of government, by establishing three institutional ways
judges participated with legislators: first, a Council of Revision—made up of
the judges of the New York Supreme Court, the chancellor, the governor, and
the president of the Senate—empowered to veto legislation on policy or constitutional grounds; second, the Court for the Correction of Errors—the
state’s highest court—made up of both senators and judges; and, finally, although this was not in its constitution, a practice of periodically commissioning judges to review and revise the accumulated body of legislation. New

18. JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 17–18
(1950).
19. See R. Kent Newmyer, Harvard Law School, New England Legal Culture, and the Antebellum Origins of American Jurisprudence, in THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN LIFE 154–75
(David Thelen ed., 1988).

718

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 77:712

York’s high level of interrelation between the judicial and legislative functions of government was not typical of the new states and much of it ended
with New York’s Constitutional Convention of 1821. Short-lived and special
as it was, however, New York’s early system of government had an important
impact on the legal development of all of the states. Historian Daniel
Hulsebosch has shown that New York provided a “fount of legal ideas in the
early Republic” and that its way of thinking about law and constitutions was
“[i]ts most important cultural export.”20 New York’s success at exporting a
new legal culture was in part due to its status as a commercial and cultural
hub and the center of great political debates, including one of the most important debates on ratification. But it was also in part because of the force of
one particular New Yorker’s written work. One could argue that the primary
significance of New York’s transitory and unique early constitution was that
it was only in its context that James Kent, the great American Institutionalist21
and New York’s famous Chancellor, could have emerged.
James Kent is remembered as a great judicial mind, and he was that.
But he could also be called a great legislator. His contributions to revising
New York’s statutory code and his decades on New York’s courts, carefully
steering those statutes into legally coherent channels, exerted an enormous
influence on the law of all the states. His work was not only some of the
most admired but also the best publicized judicial writing in the country.
When he was pushed out of office in 1821, Kent retired to write his Commentaries, which read in parts as a continuation of his work as a reviser and
interpreter of statutes. Through the Commentaries, Kent’s ideas on the
proper interrelation of areas of legislative concern with the common law, and
on the manner in which legislatures should proceed on subjects under their
purview, formed the basis of the education of several generations of American lawyers.22
As a result, Kent did much to answer the problem of legislation—the
central dilemma of how to ensure that a democratically elected legislature,
which included as many laymen as lawyers (and sometimes more), wrote
laws in conformity with the system of laws that made a republic possible. He
provided the direction required to guide American judges and legislators in
20. DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1664–1830, at 1 (2005).
So successful was this export that Hulsebosch credits New York’s legal culture with “provid[ing] a
glue of union,” which endured in spite of the states’ geographic distance and demographic diversity.
Id. at 305.
21. See John H. Langbein, Chancellor Kent and the History of Legal Literature, 93 COLUM.
L. REV. 547, 592 (1993) (making the point that Kent’s Commentaries should be seen as the last in
the great tradition of Institutionalist writings).
22. See 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (Boston, Little, Brown & Company 1873) [hereinafter 1 KENT]; 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (Boston,
Little, Brown & Company 1896) [hereinafter 2 KENT].
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their quest for a government of laws, not men. Populists decried Kent’s emphasis on erudition in all branches of government as classist and anti-democratic, and brought an end to his public career. But the work Kent did while
on the bench and in New York’s Council of Revision created the legal framework within which the broadly applicable public and administrative statutes
of the later nineteenth century could flourish.
Kent was one of America’s great judges, but his record shows such a
diversity of offices and duties that it poses a challenge to the conventional
understanding of what it means to be a judge. In this sense, Kent is representative of a small category, with perhaps a dozen members, of important
early nineteenth-century jurists. Like George Wythe and Edmund Pendleton,
Judges of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, Kent collected and revised
the statute law of his state23 and then, as a judge, interpreted and applied those
statutes. Just as Wythe did, Kent became a law professor while a judge,
teaching and summarizing the law for new practitioners and, perhaps as a
result, he showed a special concern for professional standards and often challenged and encouraged practitioners from the bench in a spirit of mentorship.24 Like Nathaniel Chipman, Chief Judge of Vermont’s Supreme Court,
Kent served as a member of the Council of Revision of his state (in Vermont,
the Council of Censors), a position that allowed him to review statutes for
constitutionality before they became law.25 Like Jeremiah Smith, Chief Justice of New Hampshire’s Supreme Court, James Kent initiated the first publication and dissemination of judicial opinions in his state.26 And like Zephaniah Swift, Chief Judge of Connecticut’s Supreme Court, and Henry
William De Saussure, Chancellor in South Carolina, James Kent published a
commentary on the law of his state, which helped to systematize the law
while also justifying Jeffersonian critics in their accusations that judges
wanted the permanence and supremacy of a code for judge-made law.27
These judges each had an outsized influence on the development and professionalization of the law of their states, garnering not only the accolades of
23. Thomas Jefferson explains this revision, and both Wythe’s and Pendleton’s parts in it, in 1
THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 42–44 (Washington, D.C., Taylor &
Maury 1853). See generally 1 DAVID JOHN MAYS, EDMUND PENDLETON, 1721–1803: A
BIOGRAPHY (1952) (describing Pendleton’s life and work).
24. For Wythe’s teaching career, see IMOGENE E. BROWN, AMERICAN ARISTIDES: A
BIOGRAPHY OF GEORGE WYTHE 220 (1981).
25. DANIEL CHIPMAN, THE LIFE OF HON. NATHANIEL CHIPMAN, LL.D. 153–55 (Boston,
Charles C. Little & James Brown 1846).
26. JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONTROLLING THE LAW: LEGAL POLITICS IN EARLY NATIONAL NEW
HAMPSHIRE 160–61 (2004) (recounting Smith’s efforts to achieve publication of judicial opinions
in New Hampshire).
27. 1 HENRY WILLIAM DESAUSSURE, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE
COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF SOUTH-CAROLINA, FROM THE REVOLUTION TO
DECEMBER, 1813, INCLUSIVE (Columbia, Cline & Hines 1817); 1 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM
OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT (Windham, John Byrne1795).
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their contemporaries and immediate successors but also a place in American
intellectual history. These are the judges that Karl Llewellyn spoke of when
he celebrated what he called the “Grand Style” of early American opinion
writing,28 and their names are continually included in historians’ lists of the
“great judges” of early American law—including, among others, Roscoe
Pound’s list,29 Lawrence Friedman’s,30 and John Phillip Reid’s.31
I have not chosen to focus on Kent because he was perfectly representative of this group. He is not. While he shared with this cadre a sense that he
stood as a guardian of the legislature and while each jurist took a broad view
of his responsibilities to the people and the institutions of his state, in both of
these characteristics, Kent was at an extreme. He was also privileged in that
he worked in a jurisdiction where his efforts to professionalize the law were
not politically contentious and under a constitution that allowed him to hold
offices, at times simultaneously, granting him broad powers of mixed judicial
and legislative character. I nevertheless focus on Kent because, as the most
respected and the most productive of this first generation of eminent American judges, he became a Napoleonic figure in American law. He influenced
the development of American jurisprudence in the generations that followed,
not just in his own state but nation-wide. It was in large part because of his
Commentaries and because of his opinions in New York’s Johnson’s Reports
that this period, during which judges viewed themselves as collaborators with
legislatures, had a lasting impact on American law.
I. STATUTES AND LAW IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC
In the years Kent served as Justice, Chief Justice, and then Chancellor
of New York, many lawyers and judges felt that legislatures met only to create exceptions to rules and distribute favors to individuals. A glance at legislative session minutes shows why. Most statutes in the early republic were
private bills rather than broadly applicable rules. When a town needed a new
road or a debtor needed more time to pay his creditors, or even when the
sheriff of a county needed more time to collect taxes, the legislatures would
act on the individual case. Broad statutes setting forth standards—for divorce
or fixing the circumstances under which a lottery could be held to raise
money—did not yet dominate the business of legislation.32

28. Llewellyn, supra note 7, at 396.
29. ROSCOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 30–31 (reprt. 1960) (1938).
30. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 88 (3d ed. 2005).
31. REID, supra note 26, at 7–8.
32. Even when legislatures did pass generally applicable statutes, they were often redundant
or badly thought-out. As Chief Justice Jeremiah Smith of New Hampshire observed,
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Today, a case turning on the interpretation of a statute is mainly concerned with discerning what the legislature intended. Not so in Kent’s day.
The prevalence of private bills created a certain wariness toward legislatures—a sense among professionals that legislative work should always be
regarded with suspicion. “‘[Statutes] are of a political rather than a civil nature,’” wrote Chief Justice Jeremiah Smith of New Hampshire. He continued,
Of those which prescribe rules of civil conduct to the citizens,
rules for making and expounding contracts, principles of decision
on the questions daily agitated in our courts of justice, the number
is small; indeed, it may be a question, whether our system of jurisprudence would suffer an injury by their total repeal.33
As another lawyer explained in 1809:
The common law, legislates by principles; the statute law, in detail. The former covers a multitude of cases, under a general rule,
well digested; and explained, applied and universally known by a
long practice. The latter, by attempting to provide for every particular case, and excluding every thing not expressly provided for,
necessarily omits many cases, and would leave them destitute of
any rule of decision, if the Judges had not the common law to fly
to, to repair and supply the imperfect work of special legislation.34
One finds this theme again and again in the words of early judges and
lawyers: what legislatures of the time did was “not law.” Court decisions,
which rested on principles rather than exceptions, were “law.” This, then,
was the prevailing view among members of the elite bar and bench: legislatures were not in the practice of creating law, and they were not good at it.
This conviction clearly animated the period’s most famous work of advocacy, Daniel Webster’s argument in Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward.35 The controversy arose when New Hampshire tried to modify
the terms of the Dartmouth College charter.36 Webster argued that “the law
of the land” did not permit a legislature to change the terms of a contract by
fiat, and he explained:

No man acquainted with the common law . . . can look into our statute-book, and not see
that the framers of the statutes, in many cases, were ignorant that the common law contained precisely the same provision; and in many cases, a provision different and better
adapted to the wants of society.
Id. at 100.
33. Id. at 160.
34. JOSEPH HOPKINSON, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE ABOLITION OF THE COMMON LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES 29 (Philadelphia, William P. Farrand & Co. 1809).
35. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
36. Id. at 539.
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By the law of the land, is most clearly intended, the general law;
a law, which hears before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial. The meaning is, that
every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities
under the protection of the general rules which govern society.
Everything which may pass under the form of an enactment, [i.e.,
a statute] is not therefore to be considered the law of the land. If
this were so . . . [t]here would be no general permanent law for
courts to administer, or for men to live under. The administration
of justice would be an empty form, an idle ceremony. Judges
would sit to execute legislative judgments and decrees; not to declare the law or to administer the justice of the country.37
The horrible of horribles that judges might sit only to execute the legislative
will proved Webster’s argument. So much for the deferential parsing of legislative intent!
Webster’s Dartmouth College argument also revealed a particular vision of the role lawyers and judges played in the constitutional structure. If
statutes could be called “the law of the land,” Webster argued, “[s]uch a
strange construction would render constitutional provisions of the highest importance completely inoperative and void.”38 It would empower assemblies
to reverse convictions, summarily transfer property from one citizen to another, or pass bills of attainder, he said. Lawyers stood in the breach, interposing the Constitution between individual freedom and legislative tyranny.
Many lawyers described this part of their work as one of the prizes of
national independence. In England, the people had “constitutional rights,”
but if Parliament overstepped its bounds, there was no power that could enforce those rights. This infirmity of the British system came sharply to the
fore during the Stamp, Sugar, and Navigation Act crises in the lead-up to the
Revolution. In the United States, by contrast, “the courts are always in fact
interfering with the government!” bragged Richard Rush, a prominent Republican lawyer.39 He continued:
Pass but an embargo law; pass but an act for the enlistment of minors; let the legislature venture to . . . touch with only the pressure
of a hair the supposed rights of the citizen, and you will soon see
what a storm will be raised about the ears of their supposed sovereign authority.40

37. 1 DANIEL WEBSTER, SPEECHES AND FORENSIC ARGUMENTS 128 (Boston, Tappan, Whittemore & Mason 1843).
38. Id.
39. RICHARD RUSH, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 11 (Washington, D.C. 1815).
40. Id.
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In Rush’s vivid metaphor, drawn from the War of 1812, the lawyer became the American defender against invasion. “The [U.S.S. Constitution]
with captain Hull in her, did not come down upon the Gurriere in a spirit of
more daring and triumphant energy than the Philadelphia or New York lawyers will sometimes do upon a statute that happens to run a little amiss!”41
The American lawyer’s ability to challenge a statute marked a sharp difference between British and American jurisprudence, a “burst[] of intellectual
and forensick rebellion . . . having [its] seat in the very soul of liberty.”42
Many judges, too, expected to “interfere” with government. Indeed,
some judges found it difficult to see how legislatures could do their work
without intervention. Vermont jurist Nathaniel Chipman explained,
“[J]udges, from the nature of their official employment, are informed of the
difficulties, which arise in the interpretation of the laws, and of those cases,
in which they prove deficient, unequal, or unjust in their operation. Such
information is highly necessary to the legislative body.”43 Poorly drafted,
inconsistently publicized, and redundant statutes complicated the administration of justice, said St. George Tucker, and “render[ed] a complete acquaintance with the laws of this country, one of the most difficult of human acquirements.”44 Apart from these practical considerations, the threat of
unconstitutional statutes was always present. Supreme Court Associate Justice James Wilson explained that although “provision has been made,” in
both the Pennsylvania state constitution and the federal Constitution, “to prevent or to check precipitancy and intemperance, in the exercise of the allimportant power of legislation” yet there is “too much reason to apprehend
that . . . the people, at once subjects and sovereigns . . . [will be] tempted to
alleviate or to alter the restraints, which they have imposed upon themselves.”45 With these challenges in view, judges did not expect to remain
passive. As Justice Wilson put it:
Far be it from me to avail myself of the abuse [of the legislative
power], and to urge it against the enjoyment of freedom. But while
I prize the inestimable blessing highly as I do, I surely ought, in
every character which I bear, to suggest, to recommend, and to perform everything in my power, in order to guard its enjoyment from
abuse.46
41. Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
42. Id.
43. NATHANIEL CHIPMAN, SKETCHES OF THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT 126 (Rutland, J.
Lyon 1793).
44. ST. GEORGE TUCKER, VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH
SELECTED WRITINGS 11 (1999).
45. 2 JAMES WILSON, THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 55 (Chicago, Callaghan & Company
1896).
46. Id. at 56.
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It is impossible to know whether lawyers in general held such views or
whether these were the opinions of the few who left voluminous papers recording their thoughts on law and society. But among those we can survey
today, this mistrust of legislatures and the related view of the role of the legal
profession was not limited to lawyers and judges who held a particular political orientation—at least not at first. That Daniel Webster and Richard Rush
would have agreed on this issue, even though they were vocal supporters of
opposing parties, suggests that these views cannot be dismissed as “political.”
Like many of his generation, Kent never gave up this essential wariness of
legislative work. It does not mark Kent an extremist, therefore, that he almost
invariably narrowed, invalidated, or interpreted with creative license the statutes that were at issue in cases before him.
II. CHANCELLOR KENT, STATUTORY REVISION, AND STATUTORY REVIEW
ON THE COUNCIL OF REVISION
James Kent once wrote in the strongest terms about the importance of
separation of powers. A free government like that of New York State must
show “a marked separation of the legislative and judicial powers,” he said.47
“[T]he power that makes is not the power to construe a law” because “the
union of these two powers is tyranny.”48 Looking over his life’s work,
though, it is clear Kent meant something different than what we would mean
if we were to repeat these maxims today.49
While in public office as a judge, Kent also served New York in two
essentially legislative capacities: as a reviser of New York’s statutes and,
throughout his public career, as a member of the Council of Revision (despite
the similarity of the titles, the two jobs have nothing to do with one another).
When redrafting New York’s statute law and while on the Council, sending
statutes back to the legislature to be rewritten, Kent’s tone was anything but
deferential. He did not seem at all worried that he was stepping over a sacred
boundary line—quite the contrary.
Kent had been in public office for just a few years when the legislature
asked him to assist in the revision of New York’s code. But he brought to
47. Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477, 508 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811).
48. Id.
49. One feels the same sense of unreality reading Edmund Pendleton’s statement on the importance of separation of powers in Turner v. Turner’s Ex’x., 8 Va. (4 Call) 234 (1792). In a case
that asked him to consider the application of a statute which he had helped to draft, he wrote, sternly,
It is the business of legislators to make the laws; and of the judges to expound them.
Having made the law, the legislative have no authority afterwards to explain its operation
upon things already done under it. They . . . cannot prescribe a rule of construction . . . .
[This is a] power to be deprecated, as oppressive and contrary to the principles of the
constitution.
Turner, 8 Va. (4 Call) at 237.
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the task the expansive vision and sense of statesmanship that would characterize all his life’s work. He also brought a certain audacity: not only did he
think he knew what was best for New York in all areas of public concern but
he seemed to feel it was his special duty to see his vision realized. One reason
for this is surely the attitude toward legislatures discussed in the preceding
section. But it may well have been exactly what the legislature expected of
him. New York was a developing polity—its legal and political infrastructure was not yet in place. Perhaps the legislature thought—as Kent certainly
did—that specially trained legal minds were needed in order to shape the
body of New York’s written law and put the state on the right track. Kent
would say, more than once, that “[l]egal learning is . . . indispensable to all
persons who are invited to . . . make, amend, and digest the law of the land.”50
In 1800, the legislature commissioned Kent and his fellow New York
Supreme Court Justice, Jacob Radcliff to revise New York’s statutes. This
sort of statutory spring cleaning occurred in most states every few decades in
the nineteenth century as legislators, realizing that a mass of antiquated, redundant, and unworkable legislation had piled up, cast around for someone
they could trust to clear out the old and identify more clearly which laws were
actually in force.51 This work concerned the public acts—that minority of
laws on the statute books that were generally applicable—rather than legislative grants to individuals or corporations. Kent said that he and Radcliff,
left 76 public acts unrevised, as they had never been altered or
amended by any subsequent law, and made a list of a great number
of acts relating to particular subjects and to corporate rights, and
which being partly executed could not be properly reenacted. A
long list of acts deemed obsolete or private was also made.52
They reduced the original 400 statutes to a final compilation of 115.53
Kent and Radcliff had been commissioned to do the work of revision
together, but Kent performed the majority of the work himself, revising sixty-

50. JAMES KENT, AN ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE THE LAW ASSOCIATION OF THE CITY OF
NEW-YORK, OCT. 21ST, 1836, at 6 (New York, G. & C. Carvill & Co. 1836) (emphasis added).
51. The process of revision sometimes introduced difficult questions into statutory interpretation cases. Judges seeking the intent of the legislature had to also inquire about whether ambiguities
or new meanings introduced by revisers formed part of the legislative intent or might be ignored as
clerical errors. See, e.g., White v. Wilcox, 1 Conn. 347, 349 n.a (1815) (“Whether the committee
of revision in digesting the materials of the present statute, or the legislature in giving it their sanction, intended to vary the act of 1744 in substance, or only to adapt its phraseology to its new connexions [sic], must, at this day, rest upon conjecture.”).
52. John H. Langbein, Chancellor Kent and the History of Legal Literature, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 547, 574 n.136 (1993) (quoting James Kent, Manuscript entry at flyleaf (n.d.), located in
Kent’s copy of 1 LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK (New York, Hugh Gaine 1789) (New York
State Library, Albany, Manuscripts and Special Collections, James Kent Law Book Collection))).
53. Id.
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three statutes to Radcliff’s twenty-seven.54 This labor-intensive task required
Kent to comprehend the details of every kind of legislative concern including,
among other things, land use, crime, master-servant relations, morality, bankruptcy, taxation, as well as the regulation of highways, various New York
industries, professional licensing, and the procedural rules of the state’s
courts. It also required an intimate understanding of the origin of these laws
and sensitivity to how the social, political, or economic realities of the present
day might necessitate amendments.
Kent recalled that “[t]he most laborious and difficult part of their task
was to abridge and improve the style, and to note imperfections on the former
acts, and especially in those, which in the preceding revision, had been taken
from the old English Statutes.”55 This characterization significantly understates his role. Kent’s amendments did include some updates that were
merely stylistic, or obviously necessary, and which could be termed “abridgments,” “improvements in style,” or the correction of “imperfections.” In
many cases, however, Kent also revised the law to suit his opinions about
good policy, the public welfare, and what due process required.
At first glance, some revisions might seem to fit the description “mere
corrections.” For example, many statutes, borrowed directly from England,
were medieval in origin and needed updating to better reflect New York’s
cultural context. But as perfunctory and mechanical as fixing an anachronism
may seem, one example suffices to show that even these required Kent to
alter the law substantially. “AN ACT for the better apprehending of felons,”
was a medieval law requiring any witness to a felony to raise a hue and cry.56
54. James Kent, Manuscript entry at back flyleaf (n.d.), located in Kent’s copy of 1 LAWS OF
(Charles R. & George Webster eds., 1802) (Columbia Law School Library, Manuscripts and Special Collections, James Kent Law Book Collection). Kent notes which
of the acts in that volume he worked on:
Mem. Of the Acts of the 24th Session in this Vol. commonly called the revised acts those
which were drafted by me and culled and digested from the former Acts, were those
designated by Chapters - 8, 9, 11, 18, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 34, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50,
51, 52, 53, 54, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 65, 66, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 78, 87, 88, 90, 91, 92, 98,
105, 113, 116, 121, 124, 130, 131, 133, 137, 138, 146, 158, 164, 165, 166, 167, 169, 170,
173, 184, 186, 189. Those which were drafted by Judge Radcliff, were those designated
by Chapters—10, 13, 24, 25, 30, 33, 43, 44, 61, 64, 77, 79, 110, 115, 125, 135, 147, 155,
156, 174, 176, 178, 180, 183, 185, 187, 188.
Id. Radcliff consistently took responsibility for the statutes dealing with elections—methods of
counting votes, district divisions, and the qualifications and duties of various elected offices. He
also took some of the cases dealing with judicial business, including, for example, the jurisdiction
of the probate court. Kent took most of the statutes dealing with the judiciary and almost everything
else. And when Radcliff strayed outside of his two areas of expertise, he sometimes left inconsistencies or gaps that Kent would have to smooth away when those statutes came before the court at
trial. See, e.g., Link v. Beuner, 3 Cai. 325 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
55. Langbein, supra note 52, at 574 n.136 (quoting Kent, supra note 52, at flyleaf (n.d.)).
56. An Act for the Better Apprehending of Felons, ch. 20 (Feb. 14, 1787), reprinted in 2 LAWS
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK PASSED AT THE SESSIONS OF THE LEGISLATURE HELD IN THE YEARS

THE STATE OF NEW-YORK
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Once the call of “thief!” or “arson!” had gone up, the statute required all
“lawful men” to chase after the felon.57 To ensure that there would be enough
chasers to immediately apprehend the wrongdoer, the statute required all men
to keep themselves armed and ready for immediate pursuit or face a fine.
This type of statute dated from an age before professional policing when “citizens had to undertake the core law-enforcement functions that we now delegate to police forces, including immediate pursuit of criminals.”58 But in
nineteenth-century New York, this system, relying on citizen-vigilantes, was
unnecessary, antiquated, and more of a threat than support to civil order.
Kent’s version replaced the hue and cry with posted notices, and only professional police—“sheriffs, coroners, constables, marshals,” and anyone specifically summoned by those officers for the purpose—could be liable for failing to make the effort to apprehend the offender.59 This kind of amendment
may have merely replaced an outdated law with a law describing what actually occurred when felonies were discovered in Kent’s New York. But the
fact that it was Kent and not the legislature who finally made this alteration
shows how much faith the legislature placed in Kent and just how much such
updates would require.
Other revisions were motivated by Kent’s sense of practicality, but even
on their face, these could not be mistaken for mere “improvements in style.”
Even practical amendments required a kind of decision making that we would
think of today as part of the legislative prerogative. For example, the original
version of “An ACT to regulate the Practice of Physic and Surgery in this
State” imposed stringent licensing requirements on all medical practitioners
in New York, requiring them to apprentice for a number of years and receive
a license attesting to their qualifications from a court of record.60 The only
exception in the original law was for out-of-state physicians who received a
request for assistance from a physician licensed in New York.61 Kent’s revised version expanded the exception in the law to allow patients to hire outof-state doctors to treat their ailments in New York, and it allowed those outof-state physicians three months to practice in New York before licensure

1785, 1786, 1787 AND 1788, INCLUSIVE 390–91 (Albany, Weed, Parsons & Company 1885). To
see its roots in medieval law, see 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE
HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 578–80 (2d ed. 1898).
57. An Act for the Better Apprehending of Felons, ch. 20 (Feb. 14, 1787).
58. JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 22 n.2 (2009); see also H. R. T. Summerson, The Structure of Law Enforcement in Thirteenth Century England, 23 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 313, 317 (1979).
59. 1 LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK 218 (Albany, Charles R. & George Webster 1802).
60. Act of Mar. 23, 1797, ch. 45, 417–19 (1797), reprinted in 4 LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK PASSED AT THE SESSIONS OF THE LEGISLATURE HELD IN THE YEARS 1797, 1798, 1799 AND
1800, INCLUSIVE 61–63 (Albany, Weed, Parsons & Company 1887).
61. Id. at 63.
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laws would begin to apply.62 The new law may have suited a lawmaker primarily concerned with patient autonomy, but the original version may well
have reflected a greater concern for public safety, addressing the fear that
out-of-state practitioners might not live up to New York standards. The original version of the law may have made it harder for a patient to obtain treatment from the doctor they preferred, but it ensured that foreign practitioners
would be under the supervision of a locally licensed doctor. Or, the old law
may have reflected the lobbying influence of local physicians, who wanted a
shield from out-of-state competition. So Kent’s revision may have implicated a policy choice—downplaying a concern for public safety in an unregulated market for medical services out of preference for the value of maximum patient choice. Or, it may have reflected Kent’s decision to reduce the
influence of a powerful constituent group. Either way, these are exactly the
kinds of concerns legislatures debate and struggle over before passing law
and which we would consider to be in the core of their purview.
Then there were changes justified neither by historical change nor practicality but instead merely by Kent’s own ideas of how society should be run.
In his amendments to “AN ACT to prevent excessive and deceitful Gaming,”63 which the 1788 legislature had copied directly from the English statute,64 Kent got rid of excess words and anachronistic references to specific
games and changed the currency of the fines from pounds to dollars—all minute and uncontroversial amendments.65 But Kent also changed the penalty
for cheating at games of chance from corporal punishment to six months imprisonment.66 This was in keeping with other recently reenacted criminal
statutes, which had eliminated most instances of corporal punishment. But it
was also an expression of Kent’s belief, as he put it, that public whipping was
a punishment “calculated not to reform but to harden offenders, because it
covers them with indelible disgrace” and that it was “injurious to the spectators, because [it] naturally excites disgust in some, and hardens sensibility in
others.”67 Not every member of New York’s legislature shared Kent’s views
62. 1 LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK 450–52 (Charles R. & George Webster eds., 1802).
63. An Act to Prevent Excessive and Deceitful Gaming, ch. 35 (Feb. 20, 1788), reprinted in 2
LAWS OF THE STATES OF NEW YORK PASSED AT THE SESSIONS OF THE LEGISLATURE HELD IN THE
YEARS 1785, 1786, 1787, AND 1788, INCLUSIVE 662–53 (Albany, Weed, Parsons & Company
1885).
64. See Act for the Better Preventing of Excessive and Deceitful Gaming 1710, 9 Ann. c. 19
(Eng.).
65. An Act to Prevent Excessive and Deceitful Gaming, ch. 46 (Mar. 21, 1801), reprinted in 5
LAWS OF THE STATES OF NEW YORK PASSED AT THE SESSIONS OF THE LEGISLATURE HELD IN THE
YEARS 1801, at 70–72 (Albany, Weed, Parsons & Company 1887).
66. Id.
67. ALFRED B. STREET, THE COUNCIL OF REVISION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 348 (Albany, William Gould 1859) (providing James Kent’s opinion on the pending legislation, “An act
relative to certain crimes therein mentioned”).
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on whipping. In fact, at least two statutes imposing corporal punishment
passed in the legislature subsequently, although these acts did not survive the
Council of Revision veto.68
Some of Kent’s amendments showed that he believed his task included
changing statutes borrowed from English law to conform to the republican
context in which they would now be used. He made several substantive
amendments to the “Act relative to Treason,” which had been identical to the
English Act of 1695–1696.69 One of his changes was a new provision specifying that the penalties imposed on the convicted traitor would not extend to
his kin and that the convicted traitor’s wife would not forfeit her dower.70
Kent described dower as “a right or title which . . . the wife acquired at the
time of her marriage, and which continues indefeasible unless she be divested
of it by her own act or consent.”71 He believed that forfeiture of the wife’s
dower upon the husband’s conviction “[took] away a legal right already attached and vested” and constituted “a violation of the rights of property . . .
contrary to the spirit of the Constitution.”72 The legislature disagreed, however. Only four years later, a new bill was proposed, restoring the forfeiture
penalty in cases of treason. Kent warned the legislature the law was,
unjust because it is retrospective in its nature, and creates disabilities arising from crimes after they have been once tried and punished; and it is unlawful because it is . . . [an] ex post facto law, and
because it inflicts new punishment for acts committed during the
late war, contrary to the spirit and letter of the treaty of peace.73
The bill passed over these objections with a majority sufficient to defeat
Kent’s Council of Revision veto.
The dower law was one instance in which the legislature specifically
disapproved of one of Kent’s alterations, but it was a rare exception. What
Kent did when he revised the statutes was quintessentially legislative, and he
did it with the legislature’s permission and gratitude. After this work was
completed, he maintained a sense of ownership over these statutes. His copy
of the book of revised laws shows that he kept notes on amendments and

68. See id. at 332.
69. See Act for regulateing of Tryals in Cases of Treason and Misprision of Treason 1695–
1696, 7 & 8 Will. 3 c. 3 (Eng.).
70. 1 LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK 216 (Charles R. & George Webster, eds., 1802).
71. STREET, supra note 67, at 333 (providing James Kent’s opinion with respect to “An act
relative to dower in certain cases therein mentioned”).
72. Id.
73. Id.

730

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 77:712

interpretations of all of the laws, but he was particularly diligent about annotating the statutes he had redrafted.74
He also kept close watch over those statutes from his position on the
Council of Revision. The Council of Revision, composed of the governor,
the three justices on the New York Supreme Court, and the chancellor, met
to review legislation before it became law and had the power to veto statutes
as unconstitutional or as against public policy. When it voted to strike down
legislation, the Council would send its decision to the legislature with a memorandum explaining the reasons motivating the veto. The Senate and Assembly could override that veto with the votes of a two-thirds majority.75 Like
his work as a reviser, Kent’s position on the Council gave him power over
legislation, but unlike the ad hoc work of revision, this role had been created
by the state’s constitution. Here, Kent’s sense of ownership over statutes and
his wariness toward the legislature seem like natural outgrowths of his explicit responsibility to guard against legislative overreaching and thoughtlessness. But it is nevertheless surprising to read Kent’s memoranda, which
are sometimes written to the legislature in the tone of an exasperated schoolmaster. It is also surprising to see just how legislative his role actually was:
Kent was a member of the Council because he was a judge—first a justice,
then chief justice of the New York Supreme Court, and then chancellor—but
only rarely did his memoranda draw on his judicial expertise.
More often, the expertise Kent displayed was that of the statute reviser,
not that of a mere interpreter. Having put together New York’s “Act to Reduce the Laws Concerning Wills into one Statute,” for example, he took
every opportunity to impede private bills by which the legislature threatened
to obscure the clear lines he had drawn. For example, an 1820 private bill,
“An act relative to the Roman Catholic Benevolent Society in the city of New
York,” sought to establish that a devise contained in the will of a recently
deceased New Yorker deeding his house and lot to St. Peter’s Church, in trust
for the use of an orphanage, was “valid and effectual in the law.”76 In his
memorandum to the legislature, Kent pointed out,
the devise here alluded to is either valid or not valid . . . . If valid,
then the provision in the bill is entirely useless. If not valid, as the
bill evidently supposes, then the house and lot . . . either descended
to his heirs at law, or escheated to the State for the want of competent heirs.77
74. See notations throughout Kent’s copy of 1 LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK (Charles
R. & George Webster eds., 1802) (Columbia Law School Library, Manuscripts and Special Collections, James Kent Law Book Collection).
75. STREET, supra note 67, at 5–6.
76. Id. at 388.
77. Id. at 388–89.
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If the property had escheated to the state, the legislature was free to give
the property for the use of the orphanage. But if the deceased New Yorker
had heirs, “the Legislature cannot divest those heirs of the estate for any purpose whatever, without their consent, or without making them just compensation.”78
In another case, Kent chided the legislature for passing a private bill that
appointed trustees to sell the property of infant heirs of another deceased New
Yorker.79 He reminded the assembly, “[t]he general law of the land vests the
estate of the ancestor in his heirs, and it ought not to be taken from them
without their consent, unless under peculiar and strong circumstances really
existing and duly disclosed.”80 He found the circumstances of the bill in
question suspicious, insofar as:
[t]he trustees named in this bill are left to dispose of the real estate
of the children . . . without any direction as to the time and mode
of the sale, and they are left to deduct their reasonable costs and
charges without any tribunal to guide their discretion or to determine what costs and charges are reasonable.81
He believed that this kind of bill could only be “dangerous to the rights
of property, and pernicious as a precedent.”82 In both cases he managed to
persuade the legislature not to pass the bills, and he continued to keep a close
watch on this area of legislation. “[T]he law of descent is so vast and so
constant in its operations,” he warned in another memorandum to the legislature, “that it ought not to be disturbed for any light or transient cause.”83
His expertise as a reviser was also on display when he prevented the
Senate, more than once, from reenacting statutes from the eighteenth century.
Kent had worked with those laws and knew them intimately. In one instance,
he criticized the Senate’s attempt to reenact a vast, obsolete eighteenth-century property law in order to get the benefit of two short provisions of that
law. To reenact the law in total would be improper, he counseled, “for by the
first section of the bill there is a very formal abolition of estates in tail; which
would imply that such estates still existed,” among other reasons.84 He also
had occasion to scold the legislature for enacting redundant laws, as he did
in 1813, over “An act limiting the period of bringing claims and prosecutions

78. Id. at 389.
79. Id. at 358–59 (providing James Kent’s opinion on “An act for the relief of the heirs of
Thomas H. Taylor, deceased”).
80. Id. at 359.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 374 (showing James Kent’s views on “An act concerning joint tenants and tenants in
tail, regulating descents and abolishing entails”).
84. Id. at 373.
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against forfeited estates.”85 The act “appears to have been intended to be a
revised bill . . . rëenacting the statute of . . . 1797,” but, he explained,
whereas that law had never been altered or amended, and was not
within the purview of the general revision of the laws, and being a
permanent statute affecting a very extensive portion of real estate,
it is at least useless, and may be injurious to the stability of these
rights to repeal and reënact it.86
He was also vigilant against the reenactment of statutes that he, as the reviser
of New York’s statute books, had decided to drop from the books.87
Although many of Kent’s memoranda from the Council of Revision
showed his expertise as a statute drafter and reviser, Kent was not, nor did he
pretend to be, a mere technician. While on the Council of Revision, many of
Kent’s arguments against statutes were neither legal nor practical—they were
based on his opinions about the legislature’s policy choices. His decisions
on policy issues show a broad involvement in the governance of the State of
New York. For instance, one important debate in the Council concerned
whether to allow legislation creating the Erie Canal to go forward, or to veto
it in order to keep money in reserve in case of a military emergency. Kent
cast the final vote in favor, explaining, “[I]f we must have a war, or have a
canal, I am in favor of the canal! I vote for the bill!”88 Not every policy
discussion in the Council of Revision dealt with such grand matters of state
as the choice between allocating resources for infrastructure or militarization.
But throughout his career, Kent occupied roles in which he was partner with
the legislature in every way. He revised legislation and then worked to make
sure the legislature understood and preserved the laws as revised. He sat in
review of the legislature’s work, and not just for constitutionality. He took
positions on the future of New York state policy in areas of legislative concern and, together with the other members of the Council of Revision, he
exercised a veto power over the legislature when it passed bills in disagreement with his views.
A. Kent’s Style of Statutory Interpretation
Kent believed that statutory law was meant to track the ways in which
the legal needs of a young republic, and of New York in particular, differed
from England. In interpreting these enactments in legal cases, Kent could
85. Id. at 376.
86. Id.; see also id. at 367 (objecting to an 1812 bill as “totally useless, an adequate remedy
being provided by the seventh section of the act entitled ‘an act concerning idiots, lunatics and infant
trustees’”).
87. Id. at 333.
88. WILLIAM KENT, MEMOIRS AND LETTERS OF JAMES KENT, LL.D., LATE CHANCELLOR OF
THE STATE OF NEW YORK 170 (Boston, Little, Brown & Company 1898).
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not set aside his experiences as a statute drafter or as a policymaker on the
Council of Revision. Therefore, he didn’t hesitate to toss English precedents
aside when they clashed with his understanding of the practical requirements
of New York governance or republican values. He felt free to do so even
when the New York legislature had adopted English statutes wholesale. In a
much-cited case in which he decided that filing in a mortgage registry constitutes notice to subsequent purchasers of land, he said, defiantly, a “contrary
doctrine would shake the foundation of all mortgage security, and lead to
every species of fraud.”89 He was so certain of this, he said, “[n]o decisions
of the English Courts, upon the English registry acts . . . could induce me to
change my opinion on the construction of our statute.”90
Indeed, in statutory interpretation cases, one finds that Kent rarely rested
on stare decisis unless he could rely on a previous opinion of his own.91 He
felt “at liberty to give [New York statutes] such a construction as will best
accord with the obvious dictates of its policy” whether he found precedent to
support that construction or not.92 Without this freedom, he would have been
unable to create a consistent jurisprudence in various areas of law. Nor, as
we shall see, did he feel much bound by any other source of earthly authority.
While he did occasionally say “[i]t is the province of the legislative, and not
of the judicial power, to change the law,”93 he nevertheless almost always
found the law he was looking for hidden in the text that the legislature provided.
This is perhaps the most telling thing about Kent’s method of statutory
interpretation: while employing it, he almost never read a statute whose
meaning he disapproved of. And when he did disapprove of a statute, he
always found himself able to cheerfully invalidate the law on constitutional
grounds and grant an injunction to the plaintiff pending a legislative amendment. This is not entirely explained by the multiple hats he wore in New
York governance. His success in always reading the law he wished to read
is partly explained by his ambition to anchor New York’s jurisprudence in
consistent principles and secure its constitutional values—an ambition he realized by taking on a role that can be best described as nation-building, and

89. Parkist v. Alexander, 1 Johns. Ch. 394, 398 (N.Y. Ch. 1815).
90. Id.
91. This contrasts with his treatment of cases arising under the common law, in which he did
follow the guidance of English precedent with regularity. Therefore, when Kent’s biographer celebrates how Kent “seldom in equity [or] in law, allowed his course to be deflected from the beaten
English paths,” he is at least half right. JOHN THEODORE HORTON, JAMES KENT: A STUDY IN
CONSERVATISM, 1763–1847, at 204 (1969); see id. at 207 & nn. 29–30 (citing cases in which Kent
followed the English common law precedent despite personal misgivings).
92. Parkist, 1 Johns. Ch. at 400.
93. Manning v. Manning, 1 Johns. Ch. 527, 534 (N.Y. Ch. 1815).
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it is partly explained by his attitude, a sometimes sanctimonious sense of prerogative which he armored with erudition. And it is partly explained by
methods of statutory interpretation, including “equitable interpretation”
which, as we have seen, Kent’s contemporaries would not have seen as outlandish.
By the early nineteenth century, some of the most respected jurists of
Kent’s day insisted that judges were required to use their equitable powers
when interpreting statutes in order to take into account the spirit of the laws
they were interpreting and to supply whatever details the legislature may
have overlooked. In his celebrated law lectures at what would become the
University of Pennsylvania, constitutional framer and Associate Supreme
Court Justice James Wilson described all proper statutory interpretation as an
exercise in “equity”:
By Aristotle, equity is thus defined—“the correction of that, in
which the law is defective, by being too general.” In making laws,
it is impossible to specify or to foresee every case . . . in interpreting them, those cases should be excepted, which the legislator himself, had he foreseen them, would have specified and excepted.
Such interpretation . . . is drawn from the spirit of the law, or the
motive which prevailed on the legislature to make it. When equity
is taken in this sense, every court of law is also a court of equity.
When equity is taken in this sense—and, applied to the interpretation of law, this is its genuine meaning—it is an expression synonimous [sic] to true and sound construction.94
Kent’s methods were therefore not unique, and he brought special insight to the task of interpretation. Kent had thought more deeply than anyone
else in New York State—members of the legislature included—about the
spirit of New York’s statute laws. He knew how related laws fit together to
express unified policy and governance objectives, because he had decided on
those objectives and shaped the laws to bend toward those goals, both
through the process of revision and in his ongoing role as a member of the
Council of Revision. His style of interpretation, therefore, could not help but
borrow from this expertise and continue that work.
In this Section, I will first look at Kent’s style of interpretation when the
statutes at issue created private rights. This shows how Kent used canons of
construction and how Kent’s use differed from how modern judges use the
same tools. I then look at how Kent interpreted public acts. Kent’s interpretation of public acts gives us some measure of how far the office of his judgeship differed from that of a modern judge, especially given that some of the

94. 2 JAMES WILSON, THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON, LL.D. 260 (Philadelphia, Bird Wilson 1804) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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cases before him involved statutes that he also vetted while sitting on the
Council of Revision.
B. Kent’s Interpretation of Acts Creating Private Rights
When interpreting a private act, Kent’s work was closest in style to what
modern lawyers might expect from a judicial opinion. Like a modern judge,
Kent began with the text of the statute, parsing the plain meaning of the terms
relevant to the dispute before him. But this was the end of any similarity
between his methods and modern interpretive jurisprudence. That is because
Kent believed, as he would make clear years later in his Commentaries, that
the mere letter of an act—even where it yielded an unambiguous plain meaning—could not displace the judges’ understanding of what the legislature
must have (or ought to have) intended.95
But if not from the letter of the act, how was a judge to know what the
legislature intended? As one mid-nineteenth-century judge explained:
[I]t is also a well settled rule in construing statutes, that the occasion and necessity of the law, from the mischief felt and the remedy
in view, are to be considered: for, from these may be collected the
intention of the lawgiver, which, when discovered, is to be followed, although it may lead to a construction seemingly contrary
to the letter.96
Like other judges of his day, Kent relied on the “mischief rule” first
articulated in Heydon’s Case in 1584 and catalogued in Mathew Bacon’s
1736 New Abridgement of the Law.97 In doing so, Kent did not seek the legislature’s purpose in the records of legislative debates or other circumstantial
evidence that might have revealed the legislators’ actual intent. Instead, he
focused his analysis on what the legislature should have intended, using as a
guide his own sense of the background law and what he believed were proper
legislative goals. Once he had identified a statute’s purpose this way, Kent
relied on two other principles of construction. First, Kent often started from
the presumption—commonly invoked in nineteenth-century opinions—that
“[s]tatutes made for the public good, and for general and beneficent national

95. 1 KENT, supra note 22, at 432.
96. Humbert v. St. Stephen’s Church, 1 Edw. Ch. 308, 312 (N.Y. Ch. 1832) (citing 1 KENT,
supra note 22, at 432); see also Woodruff v. State, 3 Ark. 285, 285 (1841) (“Such a construction
ought to be put upon a statute as may best answer the intention the makers had in view; and this
intention is sometimes to be collected from the cause or necessity of making the statute, and sometimes from other circumstances. When discovered, the intention ought to be followed with reason
and discretion in the construction of the statute, although such construction seems contrary to the
letter [of the statute].” (emphasis added)).
97. Heydon’s Case (1584) 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 639; 3 Co. Rep. 7 a, 8 a; 4 MATHEW BACON, A
NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 647–48 (4th ed. London, 1786).
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purposes, are to receive a very liberal construction”98 while, conversely, statutes for private benefit ought to be read narrowly. We will see him use this
canon both to narrow and to broaden statutory language. Second, he sought
to situate the statute before him in the context of other enactments that were
either in pari materia—that is, regarding the same subject matter—or, as was
more common with private acts, helpfully analogous. But if this approach
seems familiar to us today, its application in Kent’s opinions is nevertheless
remarkable because he was often able to rely for analogy on statutes that he
himself had rewritten during his years revising New York’s code.
Kent’s decision in Belknap v. Belknap99 illustrates his application of
these tools where private interests were at stake. The statute at issue in Belknap was not a private act, but it had been passed to benefit only a handful of
citizens. The Act “for draining swamps and bog meadows, in the counties of
Orange and Dutchess” enabled one or more of the proprietors of wetlands in
those counties to have the wetlands drained at the joint expense of all the
proprietors.100 The Act set up an administrative procedure, providing for the
appointment of inspectors and assignment of jurisdiction to a court, to determine the best method for draining a particular piece of land, and it contained
a section specifying the notice to be given to the other proprietors.101 The
only mention of non-proprietors was in the sixth section, which provided that
in case the inspectors found it:
necessary “to continue such ditch or ditches through lands adjoining any such tracts of swamp or bog meadow, for the purposes of
draining the same more effectually, they are authorized to agree
and settle with the owner or owners of such lands, for such damage
as is likely, in their opinion, to be sustained by such owner or owners, by reason of such ditch, &c.; and if they cannot agree, the inspectors are to apply to the Court to appoint appraisers.”102
Belknap arose out of a controversy under this section of the act.
The defendants in Belknap owned a piece of swampland that adjoined a
large pond. The inspectors had plotted a course through the swampland for
a ditch terminating at the pond, but this ditch alone would not be enough to
drain the swamp because the pond’s water level was too high. At the opposite
end of the pond from the swamp, the pond let out into a stream. The inspectors proposed to cut a ditch to widen this outlet, which would lower the level
of the water considerably. Widening the outlet would also, however, destroy

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns. Ch. 315, 342 (N.Y. Ch. 1823).
2 Johns. Ch. 463 (N.Y. Ch. 1817).
Id. at 463–64.
Id. at 463.
Id. at 469 (emphases added).
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the value of the pond and its outlet as a source of water for the use of the mills
downstream.103
The plaintiffs, all downstream mill owners, brought suit to enjoin the
ruination of the pond’s outlet. In answer, the defendants held up a report by
the inspectors, asserting: “we find it necessary to continue the first-mentioned main ditch through lands adjoining said tract of swamp or bog, for the
purpose of draining the same more effectually, viz. through what is called the
outlet of the great pond.”104 The question before Chancellor Kent was
whether the ditch through the outlet could truly be said to “continue” the
drainage ditch through “adjoining” land, as required under the statute.
Kent started with the language of the act. He believed that the defendants were misusing the word “continued”:
To continue a line or ditch, does not, in the ordinary or grammatical sense, admit of any intervening substance to break the continuity. It implies uninterrupted connection; and the ditch cannot
properly be said to be continued, by terminating it at the north end
of the pond, and by deepening the outlet of that pond at the southeast corner. We cannot suppose it without indulging in the same
poetical fiction by which the river Alpheus was continued from
Greece to Sicily: occultas egisse vias subter mare.105
He also sided with the plaintiffs on the plain meaning of the word “adjoining”: “[t]he ditch was to be continued through lands adjoining, that is,
through lands next to, and which touched, the swamp or bog meadow; but
none of the lands of the plaintiffs adjoin the great swamp where the main
ditch terminates.”106
Like a modern judge interpreting a statute, Kent started with the text—
so far, his opinion looks familiar. But this unequivocal plain meaning analysis, finding that “cutting down the outlet is not within the letter of the permission under the act” was merely the beginning of Kent’s opinion.107 Kent
still felt it necessary to explain why the court was “not warranted, in this case,
to construe the power liberally, and to extend it by equity” to cover the defendants’ proposed ditch.108

103. Id. at 463–64.
104. Id. at 470 (emphases added).
105. Id. at 470–71 (quoting 1 THE WORKS OF VIRGIL TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH PROSE 351
(1794) (“Tis said, that Alpheus, a River of Elis, hath hither worked a secret Channel under the Sea:
Which River . . . is now blended with the Sicilian Waves.”)).
106. Id. at 471.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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His first step was to assert that private acts (or, in this case, acts granting
rights to a select group of citizens) should be narrowly construed. Kent explained that “[t]his permission to continue the ditch through adjoining lands,
without the consent of the owner, ought to be strictly construed, and not carried beyond the plain letter of the act” because the defendants’ claim did not
“concern[] the public, but [was a matter] of mere private convenience and
profit.”109 He pointed out that the preservation of the outlet in its current form
was as useful to the plaintiffs as the widening of the outlet was to the defendants, and “the interest of each party has an equal claim on the protection of
the government; one interest ought not to be made subservient to the
other.”110 These words contrast with the tone of his opinions, discussed in
more detail below, interpreting statutes authorizing great public works like
the Erie Canal.
Kent also spent part of his opinion discussing what the legislature must
have intended by the act. Again, this sounds familiar, but it is not the same
as what modern judges do when they ask the same question. It would not
have made any sense to Kent to search the legislative record to find out what
the bill’s sponsor said on the floor of the Senate when he introduced it, or to
read which compromises and deals among assemblymen resulted in the final
language of the act. Kent’s version of “what the legislature intended” was
not concerned with what the actual legislature actually intended. Instead,
Kent’s mischief rule concerned what an idealized legislature, schooled in and
respectful of the background law on the subject, and wishing only to correct
imperfections in that law as applied, would have intended by the language of
the act.
The act in Belknap, on its face, seemed to give the inspectors the authority to widen the outlet and lower the pond if that is what they judged necessary to drain the wetlands. But this would have been a substantial departure
from the background legal norm that one private citizen’s property rights and
desire for private gain are not more valuable or more deserving of the law’s
protection than another citizen’s property right and vested business interest.
It would, moreover, have granted sweeping powers to the inspectors. And
while it may have been that the legislature fully intended to empower the
inspectors and favor the wetlands proprietors, under Kent’s analysis, this is
not what the statute would be read to say.
Instead, Kent explained that the unfettered powers granted to the inspectors were proof that the legislature could not have intended to go so far. “It
is an invasion of the rights of property; and it is evident that the act could
only have had in view cases of the most immaterial and trifling consequence,

109. Id.
110. Id.
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or the power would never have been granted with so little check.”111 Analogizing to the Highway Act, he explained:
How cautiously and guardedly are powers given, even to public
officers, to lay out highways for the use of the public, over private
property. They are not to be laid out over cultivated grounds, without the certificate of twelve freeholders, that the road is necessary,
nor through any orchard or garden of four years’ growth, without
the owner’s consent. Can we suppose that this act intended that
these inspectors should carry their ditches where they pleased,
without any regard to the improvements of others?112
Kent knew the Highway Act well, of course, because he put it together
while revising New York statutes. The purpose and care he imputed to the
legislature, therefore, was based on an analogy to an act that he had a chance
to revise and approve in advance.113
A modern lawyer reading Kent’s opinions may recognize familiar canons of statutory interpretation, some of which we use today in similar contexts. In fact, his cases interpreting private acts use not only the same tools
but arrive at the same conclusions as many modern judges would. But the
similarities can make the differences even more startling. When Kent interpreted the statutes before him in private controversies, he often played a role
quite different from that of the modern judge. While a justice and while a
chancellor, Kent was simultaneously sitting on the Council of Revision and
actively monitoring the legislature’s amendments to statutes he had revised.
It is not surprising, therefore, that there was nothing “pure” about his legal
decisions. Policy judgments crept into them all the time. This is not to demean Kent’s stature as a judge—in fact, as one of the greatest judges of his
century. It is only to acknowledge that the creature called a judge in early
nineteenth-century New York is not what we would call a judge today.
C. Kent’s Style of Interpretation of Public Acts
The difference between Kent’s approach to statutory interpretation and
modern interpretation is all the more striking in his cases dealing with public
statutes, especially when Kent wrote as a member of the Court for the Correction of Errors. The Court for the Correction of Errors was New York’s
111. Id.
112. Id. at 472.
113. Kent’s revised highway act was an amalgamation of many lengthy statutes, passed several
times in every year. The Highway Act, ch. 52 (May 4, 1784), reprinted in 1 LAWS OF THE STATE
OF NEW YORK 105–14 (New York, 1792). The process he approves of in Belknap was not Kent’s
invention, however—the outlines were present in the 1784 Highway Act, and he supplied only details; “a garden of four years’ growth” was borrowed from English law, for example, and the requirement of four years’ growth actually reduced the amount of process required before a road could
be laid. Belknap, 2 Johns. Ch. at 472.
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highest court of appeals, and it comprised the chancellor, all of the state’s
senators, the lieutenant governor, and the justices of the New York Supreme
Court. It heard appeals from both the Court of Chancery and the New York
Supreme Court. Because the members of the Court for the Correction of
Errors were recused from cases which they had decided and because the
Court’s opinions were usually drafted by a judge, Chancellor Kent would
write the decision whenever a case was appealed from the New York Supreme Court. With the members of the Supreme Court recused in these cases,
Kent was the only legal figure on the panel, and as a result, he often had total
freedom to craft the panel’s rulings. The resulting opinions do not read like
the products of collaboration. They are written entirely in Kent’s voice, and
their rationales are consistent with Kent’s related cases.
Kent’s sense of his responsibility to the state emerges very strongly in
his cases dealing with public acts. In these decisions, the mischief rule takes
on a life of its own, justifying leaps of inference so huge that they begin to
look like flights of fancy. What his extremely broad constructions reveal,
however, is that while dealing with public acts, Kent saw himself as a member of the policymaking branch of government, not just an interpreter of its
work. He was committed to making law that would help to realize the great
ambitions of the legislature, particularly when he believed that those ambitions were in the best interests of the State of New York.
Rogers v. Bradshaw114 was one of these cases. Three statutes were involved. The first, passed in 1816, empowered commissioners appointed to
oversee the construction of the Erie Canal to enter private lands as needed to
explore and examine the most eligible routes and to make surveys, levels,
and plans to fix the canal’s final route.115 The second statute, passed in 1817,
empowered the commissioners to:
enter upon and use . . . any [public or privately owned] lands, waters, and streams, necessary for the prosecution of the improvements intended by the act, and to make all such canals, locks, dams,
and other works and devices, as they might think proper, for making said improvements; doing, nevertheless, no unnecessary damage.116
This statute included a clause requiring the commissioners to estimate
the damages to any person whose lands were confiscated and to pay compensation.117 The third statute, passed in 1820, required canal commissioners to
create and render passable a new public road in any part of the state where

114.
115.
116.
117.

20 Johns. 735 (N.Y. 1823).
Id. at 738.
Id. at 738–39.
Id. at 741.
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canal work would destroy an existing public road and to register the change
of the road’s location at the appropriate county office.118
The controversy in Rogers v. Bradshaw arose when the commissioners
found that the best route for the canal cut through a turnpike.119 With this
road disrupted, the commissioners realized that another road would need to
be built in the vicinity to facilitate the transport of construction materials. In
anticipation of destroying the turnpike to dig the canal, the commissioners
plotted a course for the new road through Bradshaw’s private land. According to Bradshaw, the road crew had cut fifty dollars’ worth of his timber before he filed suit.120
The Supreme Court of New York ruled for Bradshaw. That court held
that the land was not taken for “canal improvements” at all—a substitute road
was nothing like a “lock” or a “dam”—and that the taking, therefore, did not
come within the powers granted by the act of 1817.121 The court also held
that the commissioners could not claim the power to take Bradshaw’s land
under the 1820 road act because a turnpike—a privately owned and operated
toll road—was not a “public road or highway.”122 The court also pointed out
that the 1820 road act contained no provision for compensating landowners,
so any reading of the act that allowed the commissioners to take Bradshaw’s
land would render the act unconstitutional.123
Kent reversed. He began his opinion with a logical argument. The
plaintiff had argued that a new road was not an improvement necessary to the
construction of the canal. Kent pointed out,
if the turnpike road was unavoidably encroached on by the canal,
and another road was indispensible at that place, before the canal
was commenced, and the land taken was necessary for the road,
(and all this was proved in the cause,) it would seem to follow, as
a clear logical deduction, that the land taken was necessary for the
prosecution of the improvements intended by the act.124
But Kent couldn’t rest his opinion there because there were good arguments from the text of the statute against this “clear logical deduction,” and
he had to refute the much narrower interpretation of the statute that all of the
justices of the New York Supreme Court had agreed on in the decision below.
Kent therefore focused on what he saw as the underlying issue and the
crux of his disagreement with the court over how to interpret the statute: just
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 742.
Id. at 735–36.
Id. at 735.
Id. at 737–38.
Id. at 737.
Id. at 737–38.
Id. at 739.

742

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 77:712

how much authority did three canal statutes mean to grant the commissioners? In Kent’s view, that authority was sweeping. Again, his opinion relied
on the canon that public acts are to be broadly construed. He began his opinion with this observation:
This [1816] act was the commencement of that great undertaking, which, in the language of one of our statutes, was “to advance
the prosperity and elevate the character of the United States.” It
began by sketching out the duty of the commissioners upon a liberal scale, and with just confidence in their discretion. They were
to explore and examine lands, and to cause surveys and levels to
be taken. Nothing was said about impediments to be thrown in
their way by trespasses upon private right, or that they were to
make the course of the canal bend to the interest, or the unreasonableness of individuals.125
Compare this to his much more cautious approach in Belknap. There,
he judged that the legislature’s silence on limits to the officer’s powers implied that those powers were only to be used sparingly. Here, he argued,
“[s]urely, a statute, vesting large powers, resting very much for their exercise
in undefined discretion, and checked only by the gentle admonition of doing
‘no unnecessary damage,’ ought to be construed more benignly and more
liberally.”126 He did not have to rest his opinion on his judgment that the new
road was in fact an improvement required for the canal. He could rest it on
the authority of the canal commissioners to make any decision as to what the
canal required, so long as those decisions were made in good faith and were
not an egregious abuse of their powers.
The difference between Kent’s treatment of the commissioners here and
the inspectors in Belknap was that the canal statutes concerned a grand public
works project, one which would be impossible “[i]f private rights of every
description were not to give way . . . to the permanent interest of the public.”127 His broad construction was just what Justice Wilson described as
“equity”—supplying details to statutes that the legislature would have added
if only they had considered the question before the court. When Kent interpreted words in a public statute, it was not enough to ask after their plain
meaning and go from there. Instead, he wrote, “we [must] give to the expressions the sense most suitable to the subject, and best adapted to the facility
and success of a great and generous scheme of public policy.”128

125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 738.
Id. at 740.
Id. at 738.
Id. at 740.
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The success of the Erie Canal required that Kent read the expressions in
the statute as granting the commissioners a great deal of discretion. A modern judge might employ the canon that the legislature is not to be presumed
to have intended an absurd or manifestly unjust result.129 Kent believed that
“[e]very interpretation which leads to an absurdity, or to embarrass or defeat
the purposes of the statute, is to be avoided.”130 The practical consequence
of the New York Supreme Court’s reading was that “[t]he line of the canal
must have been either diverted from its course . . . or else the progress of the
canal must have been suspended, until an opportunity was given for an application to the legislature for new powers.”131 Kent concluded, “I should
doubt, whether any construction would be a just one, that leads to such inconvenience or absurdity.”132
Here, it would be an “absurdity” to require the commissioners to apply
to the legislature for a clarification of their powers to take private property.
By contrast, in several cases in which Kent interpreted private statutes granting privileges to individuals or corporations, he had required that the defendants get legislative amendments before encroaching on private rights.133
Having upheld the commissioners’ interpretation of the 1817 act, Kent
still had to answer the part of the Supreme Court’s opinion in which it had
ruled, reasonably, that the 1820 public road act was inapplicable to a privately
owned turnpike and would be unconstitutional if it authorized the taking of
Bradshaw’s land because it failed to provide for just compensation. He answered the first challenge with an extremely broad construction of the word
“public” in the term “public roads.” “I think,” he wrote, “the construction
[the New York Supreme Court gave] is too limited for the object, and the
subject matter of the provision.”134 He continued,
A turnpike is a public road or highway, in the popular and ordinary
sense of the words, and in that sense the legislature are to be presumed to have employed them. Turnpike roads are, in point of fact,
the most public roads or highways that are known to exist, and, in

129. See Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring);
see generally EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR
LEGISLATION 148 (2008).
130. Rogers, 20 Johns. at 740–41 (emphasis added).
131. Id. at 741.
132. Id. at 740–41. Something like this reemerged briefly in the United States Supreme Court
of the 1940s, articulated best in United States v. American Trucking Associations, Inc. United States
v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) (footnote omitted) (quoting Ozawa v.
United States, 260 U.S. 178, 194 (1922) (“[E]ven when the plain meaning [of a statute does] not
produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable one ‘plainly at variance with the policy of the
legislation as a whole’ this Court has followed that purpose, rather than the literal words.”)).
133. See, e.g., Gardner v. Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. Ch. 1816).
134. Rogers, 20 Johns. at 742.
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point of law, they are made entirely for public use, and the community have a deep interest in their construction and preservation.
They are under legislative regulations . . . .135
This strained explanation did not answer another pesky problem—the
requirement in the statute that the commissioners register the change in the
public road with the local county office. This would only be possible if “public roads” were what the Supreme Court had said they were because privately
owned turnpikes were not registered at county offices at all. Kent dismissed
this objection as “not . . . sufficient to control the construction.”136 After all,
[t]here is no repugnancy in the law in applying that act even to a
turnpike road. It is, at least, a very harmless proceeding, and it
may, on many occasions, be important to the public, that there
should be this documentary evidence . . . of the change of the tract
of the turnpike road.137
The second objection—the lack of a compensation clause in the 1820
act—should have been more difficult for Kent to dismiss, given his consistent
approach to plaintiffs objecting to the incursions of corporations created by
private bills. In those cases, he expressed the emphatic belief that an “equitable and constitutional title to compensation . . . imposes it as an absolute
duty upon the legislature to make provision for compensation, whenever they
authorize an interference with private right.”138 But he had a creative solution
to this problem in Rogers. The 1817 canal act had authorized the commissioners to assess the damage they created and pay compensation, and Kent
simply read the 1817 act and the 1820 act together:
All statutes, said Lord Mansfield, which are in pari materia, are to
be taken together, as if they were one law; and, in many instances,
a remedy provided by one statute, will be extended to cases arising
on the same subject matter under a subsequent statute. The act of
1820 was only a specification of the course of duty of the commissioners in a particular case; and it would have been quite unnecessary, and, in my humble opinion, quite idle, to have provided, that
the general remedy for all damages occasioned by the exercise of
any part of the whole mass of undefined power given by the act of
1817, should apply to a portion of that power exerted in the particular manner provided for by the act of 1820.139

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
Id. at 743.
Id.
Id. at 745.
Id. at 744 (citation omitted).
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In a subsequent opinion, Kent was just as expansive in construing the
canal acts. In Jerome v. Ross,140 the canal commissioners broke up five thousand loads of stone from a hillside on the plaintiff’s land, which lay at a distance of sixty rods from the path of the canal.141 The commissioners needed
stone in order to complete a lock and dam on the Hudson River, which would
open the Champlain Canal to sloop navigation.142 If the work were delayed,
the commissioners said, a freshet in the river, which had been sunk to allow
the work to go forward, would fill with water, and the canal would not be
completed in the current season. This would cause additional expense and
redundant work for the contractors and would be detrimental to the public
because the canal system couldn’t be used until the dam was completed. Although other land (and, the plaintiff claimed, other sources of stone) lay between the plaintiff’s land and the site of the canal, the commissioners asserted
that they had the power to take the stone from his land under the provision in
the 1817 canal act which said “that it shall . . . be lawful for the said canal
commissioners . . . to enter upon, take possession of, and use all and singular
any lands, waters, and streams, necessary for the prosecution of the improvements intended by this act.”143
The court below ruled for the plaintiff on the ground that the commissioners did not “take possession of” the plaintiff’s land as authorized under
the statute but merely entered it in order to harvest and take the rock away.144
As a result, the commissioners would only pay for the damages to the land,
rather than paying for the entire parcel of land as the compensation clause of
the statute envisioned. The court also reasoned that this use of the plaintiff’s
land was not “necessary for the canal improvements [intended by the act]”
but merely “more suitable and convenient than any other upon the same side
of the river.”145 It pointed out, furthermore, that the plaintiff’s land was “sixty
rods distant from the bank of the river, on the other side of a public highway,
with severa[l] buildings and tiers of lots between them.”146 The judge wrote:
If the words of the statute warrant the taking of the stone under
these circumstances, I can imagine no possible limit to the authority or discretion of the commissioners. . . . I see nothing to prevent
their taking from the lands and inclosures [sic] of individuals, any
140. 7 Johns. Ch. 315 (N.Y. Ch. 1823).
141. Id. at 316–17.
142. The Champlain Canal was part of the great system of four canals, including the Erie, necessary to complete the legislature’s vision of having a route that would connect manufacturers and
farmers in upstate New York to markets in other states and even international markets via sloopnavigable waters.
143. Jerome, 7 Johns. Ch. at 323–34 (quoting Act of Apr. 15, 1817, ch. 262, 1817 N.Y. Laws).
144. Id. at 340–41.
145. Id. at 326–27.
146. Id. at 327.
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other materials they may fancy, in any situation, or at any distance.
Such a construction, therefore, is unreasonable and dangerous; and,
if adopted, would give sanction to a stretch of power never contemplated by the act.147
Kent reversed, again confirming and extending the authority of the canal
commissioners. He recurred to the in pari materia argument he had used in
Rogers, explaining that “these several canal acts constitute a distinct code of
statute law, and are to be taken and construed together, as being made in furtherance of one great, useful, and splendid public object.”148 Kent pointed
out that the 1816 statute authorized the commissioners to enter private lands
temporarily for the purpose of surveying and leveling and that an 1820 statute
authorized the commissioners to take rock from private lands in order to repair the canals:
The commissioners would then be authorized to take the stone
from the ledge of rock in question to repair this dam in the Hudson;
and can it be reasonably supposed, that the legislature did not intend they should have this power for the necessary construction of
the dam in the first instance?149
He also dismissed the other objection—that the commissioners could
only take permanent possession of private land, not borrow it—as nonsensical: “what possible objection can there be to the construction, allowing them
to make as much use of the adjoining grounds as should be necessary for the
prosecution of the improvements, and no more?”150
To counter the lower court’s strongest argument—that the word “necessary” in the statute could not allow the commissioners to travel a distance of
sixty rods, across private plots and onto the other side of a public highway,
eschewing other possible sources, to seize the plaintiff’s rocky ledge for use
in the dam building project—Kent relied on the maxim that “[s]tatutes made
for the public good, and for general and beneficent national purposes, are to
receive a very liberal construction, and to be expounded in such a manner, as
that they may, as far as possible, attain the end.”151 He wrote:
The word “necessary” does not mean absolute and indispensable,
or that without the use of the land, in the given case, the work could
not possibly go on. That would be the same as extreme necessity.
The legislature used the word in a more reasonable and popular
sense. It is sufficient that the land used, and the materials taken

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 327–28.
Id. at 341–42.
Id. at 341.
Id.
Id. at 342.
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from it, are needful and conducive to the object, and more convenient in the application, and less valuable, and the use of them less
injurious to the owner, than any that might readily be selected.152
Kent reiterated his holding in Bradshaw that the commissioners had a
great deal of discretion under the canal acts. And he voiced his approval for
the commissioners’ decision, especially given that the plaintiff “[did] not
state that the rock was of any use to him, as proper or fit for building, fencing,
&c., or that it was even desirable as an object of ornament or taste.”153 In that
sense, he concluded, the commissioners “did take care, as the act required, to
do no unnecessary damage. The materials must have been taken from some
adjoining land; and from whence could they have been taken with more discretion?”154 Compare Kent’s use of the word “adjoining” here to his definition of the same word in Belknap.
Viewed out of their historical context, Kent’s use of interpretive canons—for example, his invocation of the principle that statutes in pari materia
be read together—may seem like creative contortions. But Kent wrote before
the states and federal government kept neat statutory codes, properly indexed,
and updated each year. Today’s codes are constantly updated as legislatures
pass new statutes amending the old. When a lawyer wants to understand the
meaning of a statutory provision, she begins by reading the entire codified
act. And she reads it with the presumption that it forms a coherent whole that
does not contradict itself even though, chances are, the act is like Frankenstein’s monster—an amalgam of provisions and amendments tacked on at
different times. In Kent’s day, legislatures simply passed new laws on the
same subjects as existing acts, sometimes styling the new enactments as
amendments but just as often not. Every twenty years or so, the legislature
had to hire someone like Kent to “revise” the acts—to collate laws that belonged together and make sure they didn’t contradict each other or other parts
of the code. As a judge, Kent retained his revisers’ sensibility, developed
over his years working to forge New York’s statutes into a sound code. A
reviser’s role was to put statutes on the same topic together into one coherent
larger statute and smooth away the contradictions that accumulated over
time—exactly what Kent did when he interpreted public acts. In other words,
Kent’s decisions not only reflected his work as a reviser, they continued it.
And by interpreting acts in ways that made them harmonious, Kent created a

152. Id. at 340. Note that this is exactly the argument that Alexander Hamilton made against
Thomas Jefferson in the debate over the chartering of the first national bank. Alexander Hamilton,
Opinion as to the Constitutionality of the Bank of the United States, in 3 THE WORKS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 445–95 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1904). Kent, who idolized Hamilton,
would have known this argument.
153. Jerome, 7 Johns. Ch. at 331.
154. Id. at 340.
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body of law that New Yorkers could rely upon and in which their rights and
duties were more predictable.
More difficult to explain in terms acceptable to the modern lawyer is
Kent’s use of expansive constructions—for example, his reading of the term
“necessary” to mean “convenient.” The fact is, Kent felt personally invested
in the Erie project. He made it possible with his crucial swing vote on the
Council of Revision, and he came truly to believe that the success of the canal
was important to New York’s economic wellbeing. This may not seem like
a judicial concern, but one must recall that he wrote these opinions while
sitting on the Court of the Correction of Errors—a court that could not exist
under a modern understanding of the requirements of “separation of powers.”
He simply was not called on to play what we might think of today as a
“purely” judicial role.
Kent finished the substantive part of his opinion in Jerome declaring,
“[w]e have advanced too far to recede. The whole entire plan must and will
be completed.”155 The rights of the commissioners, he said, must be sufficient
to surmount “[a]ll little impediments” that stood in the way of the canal.156
These words advert to a legal holding—the precise limits of an officer’s authority under a statute—but hardly read like a legal text. Kent continued that
he “presume[d]” that he wrote with “the entire approbation of the senate,” in
quoting himself from Rogers v. Bradshaw to say:
[W]e must take expressions in the most extensive sense, when it is
probable the lawgiver had in view every thing pointed out by that
extensive sense . . . the sense most suitable to the subject, and best
adapted to the facility and success of a great and generous scheme
of public policy.157
Kent had cause to presume that his opinion carried the Senate’s approbation—not only because he had played a role in the legislative process but
also because he wrote his opinion from a court made up almost entirely of
senators.
III. AN AGE OF COLLABORATION
Kent’s style when interpreting public acts was in part the result of his
place in a unique constitutional structure. But the practice of interpreting
statutes equitably was a generational phenomenon. Legal publishing in the
first two decades of the nineteenth century was spotty, but we do have good
records from some jurisdictions and especially good records from those
judges who, with Kent, historians have remembered as the most influential
155. Id. at 343.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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legal minds of his generation. These records suggest that equitable interpretation, and the attendant sense that judges were responsible for the legal coherence of statutory modifications to the common law, was a cultural and
intellectual orientation that Kent had in common with a small class of exceptionally experienced and educated early American lawyers.
Many of these men also had diverse careers in government that made
them broad political as well as legal thinkers. In this first post-revolutionary
generation, perhaps because of the loss to the former colonies of lawyers who
had sided with the British, there seemed to be a shortage of qualified men for
important government positions. This, in addition to the stratified class structure that persisted in many states, meant that a handful of men cycled through
every important government post. Those who ended their varied careers in
the judiciary could not help but approach their cases with a broader and more
comprehensive view of the needs of their “nations” (as they called the new
states) and a sense of competence in multiple forms of government decisionmaking.
Equitable interpretation flourished in states with a strong bench and bar
and where judicial power was not made a bone of contention in a struggle
between different political factions. These conditions held as we have seen
in New York, but also in Massachusetts and South Carolina, where moderate
Republicans and Federalists were able to cooperate on judicial appointments,
the publication of opinions, and judicial reform measures in the early nineteenth century, even as curbing the power of the judiciary became a key issue
for Jeffersonians on a national level.158
Thus, South Carolina’s Chancellor Henry William De Saussure shared
Kent’s perspective on the judge’s duty to make legal sense out of an awkward
statute. De Saussure was a Federalist who had served in multiple offices of
government before he became a judge. He started his public life as a soldier
in the Revolutionary War, then served as the Mayor of Charleston, then became a member of the legislature, where he was influential in the promotion
of the bill to establish the University of South Carolina.159 In private life he
ran a very successful law practice, in which he mentored John C. Calhoun as
an apprentice, among other eminent South Carolinians.160 After ten years as
a chancellor, De Saussure published a commentary on the case law of his
court, hoping to codify his efforts toward a coherent law of equity. In that
commentary, he defined equity just as Justice Wilson had and as Kent would,

158. RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG
REPUBLIC 249 (1971).
159. WILLIAM HARPER, MEMOIR OF THE LIFE, CHARACTER, AND PUBLIC SERVICES, OF THE
LATE HON. HENRY WM. DE SAUSSURE 22–23 (Charleston, 1841).
160. 27 THE PAPERS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN, 1849–1850, at 278 (Clyde N. Wilson & Shirley
Bright Cook eds., 2003).
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as “‘a judicial interpretation of the laws, which presupposing that the legislator intended what is just and right, pursues and effectuates such intention.’”161
When he spoke generally of law and what “law” is, De Saussure described a
shared legislative and judicial responsibility for creating the governing code
of a nation. “In a country where the citizens acknowledge no master but the
laws,” he said, “it is becoming that they should be well informed what the
laws are.”162 But where could citizens find the law?
These are to be found, in the first place, in the statutes enacted by
the legal representatives, duly elected. But as no legislator, however learned or sagacious, ever did, or can provide by statute for
the infinite variety of cases perpetually growing out of the complex
and ever varying relations and transactions of men, a much greater
body of law is formed by the decisions of courts of justice, pronounced upon causes requiring some exposition or construction of
the statutes when these are not sufficiently explicit, or founded on
the great and immutable principles of justice, where the statutes are
silent.163
This was De Saussure’s vision as well as Kent’s: the judge was meant
to cooperate with the legislature to make law, construing statutes with “equity”; reading in them only “right and just” intentions; fixing the statutes’
defects when necessary; adding in details and provisos as cases called for
clarification of statutory rules; and maintaining as well the background norms
of the common law where statutes were “silent.” One sees his theory of interpretation in action in cases like Croft v. Arthur.164 In Croft, he criticized
the decision of an earlier South Carolina court, which had held that it “could
not add words [to a statute] to give the law a different effect from that which
it admitted on its face, nor to make that clear and perfect which was doubtful
and imperfect—especially as penal laws are to be construed strictly.”165 Interpreting the same statute, De Saussure dismissed this precedent as unhelpful:
With the highest deference for the authority of the learned judges
who decided this case, I have not been able to satisfy my mind with
this decision . . . . Doubtless the act was very obscurely worded,
but still I think the intention of the legislature was clear, and that
intention was sufficiently though darkly expressed.166
161. 1 HENRY WILLIAM DESAUSSURE, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE
COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF SOUTH-CAROLINA: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO
DECEMBER, 1813, INCLUSIVE xxxi–xxxii (Columbia, Cline & Hines 1817).
162. Id. at xxvi.
163. Id.
164. 3 S.C. Eq. (3 Des. Eq.) 224 (Ct. App. 1811).
165. Id. at 234.
166. Id. at 234–35.
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He found that intention, not in the words of the act, which provided no
guidance at all, but in the act’s purpose. To follow precedent, he said, would
be to agree that “the legislature meant to enact a nullity,” which De Saussure
refused to do.167
Massachusetts Chief Justice Isaac Parker, who would later help to found
Harvard Law School, also displayed a Kent-like approach to statutory interpretation in his dissent from the opinion of his court in Holbrook v.
Holbrook.168 There, he showed that he believed himself responsible for both
the legal soundness and also in some sense, the policy choices behind acts
that he was called upon to construe. Holbrook concerned a religious liberty
statute that allowed a citizen to claim an exemption from tithing to his town’s
parish if he paid his tithe to another church of which he was a member instead.169 The question before the court was whether this exemption applied
to a man who wanted to attend a church of the same denomination in a neighboring town or whether its benefit was intended to extend only to those who
worshiped at churches of a different denomination than that of their home
church.170 The statute provided:
[W]henever any person shall become a member of any religious
society, corporate or unincorporate, within this commonwealth,
such membership shall be certified by a committee of such society,
chosen for this purpose, and filed with the clerk of the town where
he dwells, such person shall for ever afterwards be exempted from
taxation for the support of public worship and public teachers of
religion in every other religious corporation whatsoever, so long as
he shall continue such membership.171
The plain text would seem to allow the plaintiff his choice of churches even
if he decided to transfer his membership to another church of the same denomination.
But Chief Justice Parker refused to read the statute this way. The whole
point of the act, Parker insisted, was to protect religious dissidents, not town
troublemakers. He explained:
[S]tatutes are not to be taken according to their very words, but
their provisions may be extended beyond, or restrained within the
words, according to the sense and meaning of the legislature apparent from the whole of the statute, or from other statutes enacted
before and after the one in question.172
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 235.
18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 248 (1822).
Id. at 249.
Id.
Id. at 249.
Id. at 254 (Parker, C.J., dissenting).
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He also argued that statutes should not be interpreted to conflict with
“[t]he general system of legislation” on any given topic.173 These precepts
expounded, he was inclined to rule against the plaintiff, a result that he insisted was not based on his personal feelings. In coming to this conclusion,
he said,
I think I have not been influenced by any apprehensions of the injurious effect of a different determination, for I do not know
whether it would be expedient, or inexpedient, to destroy what remains of the obligations of citizens to contribute to the support of
public worship by the corporations of which they are members.
Perhaps so much has been done, that to do the rest will do no harm.
At any rate, the legislature is to judge of this, and whenever it shall
express its will in clear and unequivocal terms, I shall very readily
submit.174
It would be difficult to imagine, however, how the legislature could have
expressed itself more clearly in the first instance. Parker’s decision would
seem to require legislative reiteration before its statutes could be taken as
law.
Some of the confident equitable interpretation opinions of this period
emerged from jurisdictions in which judicial power was controversial. In a
dissent to an opinion reading a new law on inheritance in Virginia, Judge
Spencer Roane also showed a tendency to consider the policy behind the law
before giving effect to its provisions. Roane came to the bench after serving
in the Virginia Council of State and the Virginia Senate, and he would be
chosen to revise Virginia’s laws twice over the course of his career. In Tomlinson v. Dillard,175 Judge Roane wrote that while he had been “[h]abituated
to respect the Legislature of our country,” he nevertheless felt “no hesitation
to say, that this law . . . was anti-republican and aristocratic; founded on false
principles, and on a total dereliction of the policy of the [earlier] act.”176 The
new statute governing descents was, he explained, “anti-republican and aristocratic, because it tended to keep up the wealth of families; and so contravene the wise policy which annihilated entails in 1776.”177 For this and other
reasons, he voted to limit the effect of the change in the law by reading part
of the statute as a mistake.
Interestingly, North Carolina’s Thomas Ruffin, who was celebrated as
a great judge in a state especially hostile to the judiciary, also gave statutes

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.
Id. at 261.
7 Va. (3 Call) 105 (1801).
Id. at 110.
Id.
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atextual interpretations.178 Ruffin began his judicial career after having
served for four years in the North Carolina House of Representatives, including one term as its Speaker. He is remembered for his position as Chief Judge
of North Carolina’s Supreme Court in the 1830s, but brief stints as a superior
court judge earlier in his career, from 1816 to 1818, and then again from 1825
to 1828, established his reputation as a judge and a systemic thinker.179 During these years, his statutory interpretation cases showed greater concern for
his own sense of the justice and the legal coherence of the outcome of a case
than any precedential opinions construing the same statute or even the text of
the statutes he construed.180 Ruffin believed that the role of the judge was to
incorporate legislation into the general fabric of jurisprudence by interpreting
it to cohere, rather than conflict, with preexisting legal structures. In some
statutory interpretation cases, Ruffin made no pretense of parsing the language of the act itself, relying for his judgments on common sense informed
by common law norms and values.181 In others, Ruffin bolstered his interpretation by showing that, under the common law, the case would have turned
out the same.182 His court also made use of the common law to supply defects
in legislation even when this resulted in a broader interpretation and application of criminal statutes.183

178. See generally LAURA F. EDWARDS, THE PEOPLE AND THEIR PEACE: LEGAL CULTURE AND
THE TRANSFORMATION OF INEQUALITY IN THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY SOUTH (2009) (offering an
important and interesting study exploring Thomas Ruffin’s jurisprudence).
179. William A. Graham, Life and Character of the Hon. Thomas Ruffin, Late Chief Justice of
North Carolina (Raleigh, 1870), in 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS RUFFIN 19, 23–25 (J. G. de Roulhac
Hamilton ed., 1918).
180. See, e.g., Frew v. Graham, 4 N.C. (Taylor) 609, 609 (1817) (deciding whether a federal tax
act intended to tax pig iron manufactured into bars in the same foundry just once or twice—once
for each stage of production). In Frew, Ruffin relied on no precedent, no rules, and no authority
except his own common sense—and, perhaps, an exclamation point and italicization—to carry the
opinion. Id.
181. See, e.g., id. Likewise, in Perry v. Perry, Ruffin was asked to decide whether the portion
a widow had taken out of her husband’s estate was justified by the statute granting her dower. 4
N.C. (Taylor) 617, 618 (1817). He said simply that the allowance she had taken was “so palpably
extravagant and bottomed on such a wrong construction of the law,—that it must be set aside and a
new one made.” Id. Again, he cited no authority.
182. See, e.g., State v. Wasden, 4 N.C. (Taylor) 596, 597 (1817) (concurring in the judgment
and admitting that the case was controlled by a statute but also pointing out that the answer would
be the same even without the statute); Hood v. Orr, 4 N.C. (Taylor) 584, 584 (1817) (“The act of
Assembly is positive upon this subject; and since the case of Robertson v. Stone, 2 N.C., 402, the
courts have always refused to relax the rule of law, without any regard to the causes of failure of
the appellant. Those decisions appear to me to be very proper, independent of the statute.”).
183. See, e.g., State v. Walker, 4 N.C. (Taylor) 661, 662 (1817) (holding, in an opinion by Seawell, that even though the indictment for forgery under the forgery statute was insufficiently proven,
no appeal would be taken because the defendant was still guilty of forgery as defined under the
common law). The interpretive canon that penal statutes are to be strictly construed was not thought
applicable although it would most likely prevent a judgment like this today.

754

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 77:712

In Pennsylvania, on the other hand, the politicization of judicial power
clearly had an impact on judges’ use of equitable interpretation. Pennsylvania’s court, which was the victim of several legislative experiments aimed at
democratizing and de-professionalizing adjudication, shows a particularly interesting duality in its statutory interpretation cases. In cases concerning statutes that modified or elaborated subjects that remained chiefly governed by
the common law, Pennsylvania’s judges, and particularly Pennsylvania’s eminent judge John Bannister Gibson, used equitable construction as the norm
whenever the statute seemed incomplete or contained an awkward phrase.184
But in cases interpreting those statutes, like Pennsylvania’s mandatory arbitration acts, which specifically constrained the court’s jurisdiction, the judges
seemed to take a perverse enjoyment out of reading legislation strictly to the
letter even when those textualist readings resulted in inconvenience and injustice.185
Government and especially legislative experience also made an impact
on how judges interpreted statutes, even though these other members of

184. See, e.g., Hersha v. Brenneman, 6 Serg. & Rawle 2, 4 (Pa. 1820).
[I]f . . . rigidity of construction were to prevail, it would prevent grand-children from petitioning the Court to award an inquest, and their right as to that, I believe, was never
doubted. Although not within the words, they are so entirely within the equity of the act,
which intended to invest them with all the interest and privileges which their father could,
if he had survived the intestate, have claimed, that we cannot hesitate.
Id.; see also Waln v. Shearman, 8 Serg. & Rawle 357, 360 (Pa. 1822).
These are strong expressions; so strong indeed, that I was at first induced to think it was
impossible to get over them, even in cases where they produced extreme inconvenience;
because, where the intention of the Legislature is clear, the Courts of justice are to carry
it into effect, and are not responsible for consequences. This is a principle not to be
contradicted, but at the same time it must be acknowledged, that general expressions are
sometimes to be modified where they are inconsistent with other parts of the same law,
or of other laws on the same subject; or where they would produce a degree of injustice
not to be attributed to the Legislature.
Waln, 8 Serg. & Rawle at 360.
185. See, e.g., Flanegan v. Negley, 3 Serg. & Rawle 498, 499 (Pa. 1817).
The Court, however, are not ignorant of many inconveniences attending the arbitration
system. They have, on several occasions, pointed them out. But it would be a breach of
duty in them, to assume the right of amending the law. They are bound to give an honest
interpretation to the acts of the legislature, according to what appears to them to be their
true meaning. When inconveniences are felt, it is to be presumed, they will be remedied,
by those to whom the constitution has entrusted the power. In conformity to the construction already established, I am of opinion, that the judgment in this case should be
affirmed.
Id.; id. (Duncan, J., concurring) (“The inconveniences arising from this construction, are many, and
call loudly on the legislature for amendments and alterations. But this consideration will not justify
the Court in departing from the provisions of the act.”); see also Morrison v. Weaver, 4 Serg. &
Rawle 190, 190–91 (Pa. 1818) (“An appeal . . . is certainly not expressly given [in one section of
the arbitration statute]; and this Court cannot supply that which the legislature has totally omitted,
even though we should suppose the omission arose from an oversight.”).
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Kent’s generation did not hold their several government posts simultaneously, as Kent did. As a result, a researcher must always read statutory interpretation cases with an eye to the biography of the men who wrote them.
For example, Nathaniel Chipman of Vermont, whose early career switched
back and forth between legislative and judicial office, also served on Vermont’s Council of Censors, an institution charged with reviewing legislation
for constitutionality before it became law. Knowing his career history, one
reads Chipman differently when he subsequently interprets statutes in court.
To understand his interpretation of ambiguous laws, one must check to see
whether he had a prior chance to study and approve them as a censor or
whether he was serving as a representative in the state assembly when those
acts were passed. In fact, he did participate in the assembly debate on an act
that came before his court in an 1814 case.186 Therefore his decision in that
case, citing the principle that “the Court ought anxiously to avoid any construction of a law, which would imply in the legislature, either an ignorance
of their powers and duties, or a design to violate the national constitution,”187
cannot be read as a dry recital of a canon of construction. He is relying on
memory and, if memory fails, he is giving himself the benefit of the doubt.
One judge whose experience clearly played a role in interpretive style
was Zephaniah Swift of Connecticut. When Swift wrote his first digest of
Connecticut law, A System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut, his public
service had been confined to the legislative branches. He had served in the
state legislature for twelve sessions, including four terms as the clerk of the
Connecticut Assembly and one term as Speaker, and he had also served for
four years as one of Connecticut’s representatives to Congress.188 His 1795
treatise included a list of canons of statutory construction, including the idea
of construing statutes equitably. But he warned that reading statutes atextually “gives too great latitude to judges, and may be improved to oppressive
purposes. It destroys that uniformity, certainty and precision, which are the
essence of law. It throws the rights of mankind afloat, by placing them upon
the arbitrary opinions and capricious whims of judges.”189 If judges strayed
too far from the text, “[t]he lawyer can never tell, how to advise his client,
and the people cannot know the law. This rule therefore should be admitted
with great caution, and practiced upon with great prudence.”190 Admitting,

186. Starr v. Robinson, 1 D. Chip. 257 (Vt. 1814).
187. Id. at 261; see generally DANIEL CHIPMAN, THE LIFE OF HON. NATHANIEL CHIPMAN,
LL.D. (Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1846).
188. 4 FRANKLIN BOWDITCH DEXTER, BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE GRADUATES OF
YALE COLLEGE WITH ANNALS OF THE COLLEGE HISTORY: JULY, 1778–JUNE, 1792, at 60 (1907).
189. 1 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 49 (Windham, John Byrne 1795).
190. Id.
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then, that interpreting statutes equitably was within the judicial toolkit, Swift
expressed serious misgivings about its usefulness and propriety.
After this first 1795 publication, in 1799 and again in 1801, Swift was
elected to Connecticut’s “Council”—consisting of the governor, lieutenant
governor, and twelve assistants. Until 1806, this branch of government exercised veto power over all legislation and also convened as Connecticut’s
highest court of appeal.191 Swift was then appointed a judge of Connecticut
Superior Court, a position he held for eighteen years, the last five as chief
justice.192 While on the court, he became increasingly frustrated with legislative interventions into legal causes, and he even published an angry pamphlet denouncing the assembly for reversing one of his decisions.193 In short,
he went from holding office as the assembly’s champion, to an office that
made him its guardian, to one that forced him to be its critic. The final public
office of his career made him into the assembly’s editor: when the 1818 ratification of Connecticut’s first written constitution removed Swift from his
judgeship, Connecticut’s legislature commissioned him and two others to revise its laws to conform to the new constitutional order.194 Swift performed
the majority of this work and subsequently published his second digest and
commentary on the laws of Connecticut.195
Between the publication of this first digest and his second in 1822,
Swift’s views had undergone a shift. In the 1822 work, Swift defined law as
the realization of “certain first principles existing in the nature and fitness of
things” which “have been introduced by the statutes of the legislature, or have
been derived from the dictates of reason,” as well as from policy considerations.196 Swift’s later work discussed methods of statutory interpretation, including an expanded list of canons of construction. In the 1822 list, he described equitable construction simply as “sometimes necessary.”197 He
explained that judges must sometimes decide that “acts within the letter shall
not be considered within the meaning, and acts not within the letter shall be

191. See id. at 63 (providing Swift’s view of this branch of government and its duties under “Of
the Legislative Power”); id. at 93 (providing Swift’s view of this branch of government and its
duties under “Of the Judicative Power”).
192. DEXTER, supra note 188, at 61.
193. ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, VINDICATION OF THE CALLING OF THE SPECIAL SUPERIOR COURT, AT
MIDDLETOWN, ON THE 4TH TUESDAY OF AUGUST, 1815, FOR THE TRIAL OF PETER LUNG,
CHARGED WITH THE CRIME OF MURDER. WITH OBSERVATIONS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER
OF THE LEGISLATURE TO INTERFERE WITH THE JUDICIARY IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
(1816).
194. DEXTER, supra note 188, at 61.
195. 1 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT (New Haven, S. Converse 1822).
196. Id. at 10.
197. Id. at 11.
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considered within the meaning.”198 The warning against judicial power, so
prominent in the 1795 edition, had vanished. Toward the end of Swift’s career, Swift sometimes showed a willingness to expand statutes—even penal
statutes—by importing common law norms in order to embrace behavior that
their text did not reach. 199
In sum, the states’ most influential judges tended, like Kent, to see themselves as responsible for the coherence, justice, and sometimes even the policy behind the statutes they were asked to construe. They would add provisos, expand coverage, or narrow the effects of statutes whenever they felt it
was necessary. These men made up the small group of judges who played an
outsized role in the government of their states and whose works cast a long
shadow over their state’s subsequent jurisprudence.
Equitable interpretation seems startling to a modern observer, but early
nineteenth-century interpretation must be viewed in its context. That context
includes not only rafts of unconstitutional statutes but also extremely poorly
drafted ones. In a Virginia case, for example, judges and lawyers made reference to the legislative history of a statute to argue over what text was meant
to fill a blank line left in the statute book by the clerk of the assembly, where
part of the text of the law should have been.200 In an opinion from Pennsylvania, the question under discussion was whether a senseless parenthesis
mark should have been placed in front of one word or another and which
other words or marks might have to change in order to read anything rational
in the badly transcribed text of the law.201 In a case from Connecticut, a judge
faced a question of whether an amendment to a statute appearing after a general revision of the laws was actually intended by the legislature or whether
it was a revisers’ error.202
One thing that judges practicing equitable construction had in common,
therefore, was that they frequently had to deal with obvious and inescapable
legislative mistakes and instances of carelessness. With this understanding,
the freedoms they took with legislative work of all kinds seem less strange.
A second commonality among these judges was their legislative experience,
which they probably believed equally useful when deciding whether a parenthesis was misplaced or whether the legislature really intended to change the
198. Id.
199. See Fox v. Hills, 1 Conn. 295, 299–300 (1815) (expanding a fraudulent conveyance statute
to prohibit conveyances that would tend to defeat the claims of a judgment creditor even though the
statute only intended to protect the claims of a contract creditor).
200. Tomlinson v. Dillard, 7 Va. (3 Call) 105, 118 (1801).
201. Simpson v. Morris, 3 Yeates 104, 117–18 (Pa. 1800).
202. White v. Wilcox, 1 Conn. 347, 349 n.(a) (1815) (“Whether the committee of revision in
digesting the materials of the present statute, or the legislature in giving it their sanction, intended
to vary the act of 1744 in substance, or only to adapt its phraseology to its new connexions [sic]
must, at this day, rest upon conjecture.”).
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law of descents. In any case, so long as the task of interpretation constantly
called upon the judge to revise entire sentences to give them rational or grammatical structure, it is not hard to see how a jurisprudence of equitable interpretation might persist.
One characteristic which did not unite these judges was their politics.
Although Jeffersonian rhetoric of the early nineteenth century vilified meddlesome Federalist judges, the jurisprudential tendencies I describe were
more clearly a matter of state constitutional structure, along with the states’
politics of judging and the individual judge’s experience, education, and personality. Spencer Roane, who would have edited out troublesome amendments to Jefferson’s statute abolishing primogeniture, was a leading Jeffersonian Republican and one of the members of the “Essex Junto.” He would
later, under a penname, engage in an acrimonious pamphlet debate with John
Marshall over states’ rights and Marshall’s Federalist jurisprudence.203
Zephaniah Swift of Connecticut, who was much more hesitant to bend the
language of a statute even when his feelings ran high, participated in the Federalists’ Hartford Convention. Although it is tempting to parrot the trope of
the high-handed Federalist bench, it is actually unhelpful to think of statutory
interpretation philosophies in terms of political orientation. But whether motivated by partisanship or not, and however the poor quality of legislative
drafting may explain it, equitable construction afforded these judges enormous political power.
This is especially interesting because during the first few decades of the
nineteenth century, that classic measure of judicial power—judicial review
for constitutionality—was still only very rarely used. Judges of this generation understood that a decision striking down a statute was fraught with danger to the institution of the court and should be hazarded only in extreme and
unavoidable cases of legislative wrongdoing.204 What this history of equitable statutory interpretation reveals, however, is that the pre-history of judicial
review represented an opportunity for judicial creativity and strength. Because courts could not easily set legislation aside, they instead took a greater
role in molding statutes into acceptable forms. Although only some judges
saw this as their responsibility, these were scattered throughout the nation’s
jurisdictions—those I’ve mentioned in New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and Vermont,
along with Francois-Xavier Martin in Louisiana, whose work became a

203. See F. THORNTON MILLER, JURIES AND JUDGES VERSUS THE LAW: VIRGINIA’S
PROVINCIAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVE, 1783–1828, at 87–90 (1994).
204. When early nineteenth-century judges did strike down statutes, it was with an extremely
apologetic tone. See, e.g., Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N.H. 199, 202 (1818).

2018]

INTERPRETATION AS STATECRAFT

759

model for codifiers,205 and Jeremiah Smith from New Hampshire, the home
jurisdiction of Daniel Webster and other important lawyers.206
Equitable interpretation was accepted by the leading thinkers (perhaps I
should say the loudest, or most published, thinkers) on American law, but my
sense is that many judges considered creative interpretations of statutes out
of bounds. One point of similarity between Kent and the other judges who
practiced equitable interpretation was their extreme erudition. Through extensive preparation for their role as judges, they had achieved a perspective
from which they believed they could judge whether a statute transgressed a
legal norm. Not all early nineteenth-century judges were well-educated in
the law, however, so many had no basis from which to oppose or correct the
direction their legislatures had taken. Also, whether as a result of their take
on Jeffersonian Republican ideology or simply because of their jurisprudential philosophy, many believed that state constitutions had made the legislature the ultimate authority on how law should develop, and their opinions
reflected that perspective.207 In 1803, when a lawyer urged an enlarged, or
“equitable,” construction of a public statute to a Kentucky court, the court
responded that if its members,
had been in the legislature when the law was on its passage, their
humanity and justice might have induced them to have provided
for those cases; but in their judicial capacity they are bound by settled rules of construction, and it is their duty to declare what the
law is and not what it should have been.208
My sense is that more decisions like this one show up in the case law of
this period than those claiming the right through “equity” to alter statutory
language. But the judges that practiced equitable interpretation also wrote
the treatises on their states’ law. Through law journals’ selective reporting
of important decisions and other sources, these were the jurists who spread

205. See Michael Chiorazzi, Francois-Xavier Martin: Printer, Lawyer, Jurist, 80 L. LIB. J. 63
(1988) (providing a pithy overview of Martin’s life and significance and a very helpful bibliography
of works both by and about him).
206. See JOHN PHILLIP REID, LEGITIMATING THE LAW: THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL
COMPETENCY IN EARLY NATIONAL NEW HAMPSHIRE 6–8 (2012) (identifying some of the great
lawyers who originated from New Hampshire).
207. See JOHN PHILLIP REID, LEGISLATING THE COURTS: JUDICIAL DEPENDENCE IN EARLY
NATIONAL NEW HAMPSHIRE 4 (2009) (offering a broad perspective on judging, which “recounts
the struggles in the early republic of two extremes . . . those who wanted a government of law defined and administered by men educated in the common-law jurisprudence of England, making
rulings and applying principles without regard for the politics of the day” and “at the other extreme . . . people who mistrusted the law of professional lawyers and wanted all law to originate
from republican institutions, whether law-applying jurors or law-creating legislators”); see also
ELLIS, supra note 158, at 4.
208. Nichols v. Wells, 2 Ky. (Sneed) 255, 259 (1803).
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their influence to subsequent generations of lawyers in their own states and
across state lines.
Among these influential judges, James Kent was at an extreme, in his
position in government, his ambition, and his philosophy of jurisprudence,
but he was also the most influential of this group and the representative of
this generation of great legal thinkers. A populist majority definitively rejected both Kent and the institutions that had shaped him in New York’s Constitutional Convention of 1821, when they abolished the Council of Revision,
diluted the power of the Chancellor, and capped judicial careers at sixty years
of age (Kent was then in his fifty-ninth year). But Kent’s influence only
grew, both through the opinions published in Johnson’s Reporter and through
his great opus, Kent’s Commentaries. If, for political, philosophical, or constitutional reasons, many judges felt they could not use Kent’s expansive
style of equitable construction or cite to English precedent alone when interpreting statutes, they could and did cite Kent as an authority on the construction of similar statutes in New York. Through the Commentaries, Kent influenced the legislatures of other states as they passed laws, informed two
generations of lawyers and judges as they interpreted statutes, and provided
one of the basic texts for American legal education through the remainder of
the nineteenth century.
IV. KENT’S COMMENTARIES AS AN EXTENSION OF HIS LEGISLATIVE
WORK, AND THEIR INFLUENCE
Kent’s Commentaries are a collection of his Columbia University lectures on law. Focused as they are on serving up what Lawrence Friedman
called “the meat and potatoes of law,”209 the text can be dry in places. It is
more utilitarian than philosophical, aimed at the law student and practitioner.
But to a reader familiar with Kent’s life, the Commentaries read as something
of a memoir—the self-justifying memoir of the fallen statesman. He lavishes
attention on difficult questions that came before him in particular cases and
on areas of law in which he revised New York’s statutes. One sees echoes,
too, of opinions he wrote during his tenure on the Council of Revision.
Although not without its critics, Commentaries on American Law was,
according to contemporary observers, the best-selling American law book
yet.210 It became the basic text for legal education at Harvard, Yale, West
Point, and the University of Nashville, among other places.211 And its success brought Kent’s particular style of interpretation and his view on how

209. Lawrence M. Friedman, Heart Against Head: Perry Miller and the Legal Mind, 77 YALE
L.J. 1244, 1251 (1968).
210. HORTON, supra note 91, at 303–04.
211. Id. at 302–03.
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statutes and common law should interact to a wide and receptive audience of
students and practitioners.
One of the lectures in the Commentaries is dedicated to statutes and their
interpretation. The discussion begins with William Blackstone’s injunction
that an act of the legislature is “the exercise of the highest authority that the
kingdom acknowledges upon earth” and that an act “delivered in clear and
intelligible terms, cannot be questioned, or its authority controlled, in any
court of justice.”212 But Kent immediately qualified these statements, explaining that one of the ways courts respect the absolute authority of the legislature is by interpreting their acts to fit with background law:
When it is said . . . that a statute contrary to natural equity and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, is void, the cases
are understood to mean that the courts are to give the statute a reasonable construction. They will not readily presume, out of respect
and duty to the lawgiver, that any very unjust or absurd consequence was within the contemplation of the law.213
It is true, Kent acknowledged, that there are some statutes that simply
have no ambiguities to exploit in this way, and “if it should happen to be too
palpable in its direction to admit of but one construction, there is no doubt in
the English law as to the binding efficacy of the statute. The will of the legislature is the supreme law of the land, and demands perfect obedience.”214
But he qualified even this statement by adding that, though this supremacy
exists in principle, “we cannot but admire the intrepidity and powerful sense
of justice which led Lord Coke . . . to declare . . . that the common law doth
control acts of Parliament, and adjudges them void, when against common
right and reason.”215 After citing several examples of great jurists of the past
who dared to uphold the integrity of the common law against the depredations
of Parliament, he finally turned to the interpretation of American statutes,
starting (of course) with the principle of judicial review.216
Kent then turned to the nuts and bolts of interpretation, offering a list of
interpretive canons, many of which would be familiar to the modern lawyer,
and directing students on such diverse points as how much weight to give the
titles of statutes, how provisos should operate, how to read technical words,
narrowly construe penal statutes, and broadly construe remedial ones. Apart
from these textual guidelines, however, Kent stressed that “[t]he real intention [of the legislature] . . . will always prevail over the literal sense of

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

1 KENT, supra note 22, at 447.
Id.
Id. at 447–48.
Id. at 448.
Id. at 449–50.
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terms.”217 And as his judicial opinions revealed, the search for the legislature’s “real intention” left room for quite a bit of judicial discretion:
When the words are not explicit, the intention is to be collected
from the context, from the occasion and necessity of the law, from
the mischief felt, and the objects and the remedy in view; and the
intention is to be taken or presumed, according to what is consonant to reason and good discretion. These rules, by which the sages
of the law . . . have ever been guided in seeking for the intention of
the legislature, are maxims of sound interpretation, which have
been accumulated by the experience, and ratified by the approbation of ages.218
The statutory interpretation section of the Commentaries certainly received its fair share of citations in judicial opinions of the nineteenth century,
but the collection and dissemination of bare maxims of interpretation was
only the least of the ways in which Kent influenced American judges’ interpretation of statutes. Kent also showed how courts could interpret statutes
without running afoul of background legal norms by explaining the construction New York had placed on its own statutes, often referencing his own
opinions. For example, he illustrated the canon on remedial statutes with his
opinion interpreting New York’s Mortgage Registry Act.219 In his lectures
on the law of husband and wife, he described New York’s divorce statute in
detail, and then he went on to discuss defenses to a divorce suit—defenses
which were not in the statute but which were drawn from common law precedent, such as lapse of time, cohabitation, and proof of the plaintiff’s adultery.220 Similarly, he included common law elaborations and references to
his own opinions in his discussion of New York’s extradition statute221 and
its habeas statute,222 among many others.
Judges from other states leaned heavily on Kent in their own statutory
interpretation cases. Sometimes, they looked to him as a source of canons of
interpretation.223 But more often, judges cited Kent’s substantive interpretation of similar New York statutes. In Prescott v. Carr,224 a New Hampshire
case involving a dispute over a will, the presiding judge was confronted with
issues that New Hampshire’s inheritance statute left ambiguous. He cited

217. Id. at 462.
218. Id. (footnote call number omitted).
219. Id. at 465.
220. 2 KENT, supra note 22, at 96–107.
221. 1 KENT, supra note 22, at 36–37.
222. 2 KENT, supra note 22, at 26–32.
223. See, e.g., Shillaber v. Waldo, 1 Haw. 21, 22 (1847) (referring to the “late and deeply lamented Chancellor Kent” for general principles of interpretation).
224. 9 N.H. 453 (1854).
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Kent’s Commentaries, and all of the sources that Kent included in that section, for the principle that whole- and half-blood descendants inherit equally.
And he ruled that real and personal property “goes alike to the same persons
and in the same proportions.”225 In doing so, he relied on the English statute
of distributions, explaining that this was an authority “which, says Chancellor
Kent, being founded in justice, and in the wisdom of ages . . . has been well
selected as the most suitable and judicious basis on which to establish our
American law of descent.”226 The ruling required no other justification. Hays
v. Thomas,227 an 1826 Illinois opinion, used the Commentaries to resolve the
same ambiguity as to whole- and half-blood inheritance under Illinois law.228
Even when courts did not rely solely on the Commentaries, they used
the Commentaries to lend weight to their opinions. This was true even in
decisions driven by the plain meaning of the statutory text, which would seem
to require no support at all. In Guion v. Burton,229 an 1838 Tennessee case,
the dispute was over whether a parcel of uncultivated land could pass by descent from a man who, under English law at least, had never actually been
“seised” of the land; although he owned the land in question by a grant from
the government, he had never set foot on the property himself.230 The Supreme Court of Tennessee cited Kent for the observation that the rule requiring actual possession of the land was “founded in feudal reasons” and “can
have very little force when applied to our modes of conveyance, and the circumstances of this country.”231 In the United States, most of the land remained uncultivated; actual entry into lands given by grant was often “difficult, if not impossible” and actual possession by the purchaser of a plot of
land could not easily be proved even if it had occurred.232 Furthermore, many
parcels were owned by absentee English investors and other speculators. The
court concurred with Kent that “[t]o a country such as this, a strict adherence
to the common-law doctrine of seisin would be exceedingly inconvenient,
and destructive of rights which it is the office of the law to preserve.”233 Having made these observations, the court looked at last to the text, which said
in black and white that actual possession was not a requirement of Tennessee’s inheritance statute. The court observed, however, that “[i]f this view of

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id. at 460.
Id.
1 Ill. (Breese) 180 (1826).
Id. at 181 n.a.
19 Tenn. (Meigs) 565 (1838).
Id. at 568.
Id. at 570–71.
Id. at 571.
Id.
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the effect of our statute required support, it is to be found in the construction
Chancellor Kent gives to the New York statute upon this subject.”234
An 1851 Pennsylvania case concerned whether a woman could convey
real estate that she owned separately from her husband. Here, too, Kent supplied the reasoning and supported the rule of decision. “The weight of authority, as Chancellor Kent remarks, would seem to be in favor of the existence of a general rule of law, that the husband must be a party to the
conveyance.”235 The Supreme Court agreed with Kent: “[s]uch a rule is
founded on sound principles arising from the relation of husband and wife . . .
to avoid family discord and to protect her interests.”236 Although some states
had made exceptions to this rule, the court said it was “happy to say Pennsylvania is not one of them.”237 Only then did the court look to the text of the
statute, which said, as plainly as possible, that both the husband and wife
must execute a deed disposing of the wife’s property.238
Even where judges looked to the decisions of other courts for support,
it seems that they often relied on the Commentaries to find the relevant precedent. Their citations were therefore subject to Kent’s editing and pre-approval. For example, in a dispute over which words were necessary to create
a warranty under Alabama law that a parcel of land was being sold free of
encumbrances, the Supreme Court of Alabama found a decision interpreting
Pennsylvania’s identical statute helpful. But the court did not cite Pennsylvania’s reporter—it cited Kent. The court noted that Kent believed the Pennsylvania case “furnish[ed] a correct exposition, not only of the Pennsylvania,
but of our own statute also” and the court quoted Kent’s explanation of why
Pennsylvania had gotten it right.239
As the success of the Commentaries confirmed Kent’s stature as one of
the nation’s foremost jurists, citations to his opinions recorded in New York’s
Johnson’s Reporter also became more frequent. In Ricks v. Doe ex rel.
Wright,240 the Supreme Court of Indiana had to decide whether a deed later
in time, though first recorded, would take legal precedence over a prior, unrecorded deed of which the subsequent purchaser had actual notice. The case
turned on interpretation of Indiana’s 1818 registry act.241 The court decided

234. Id.
235. Trimmer v. Heagy, 16 Pa. 484, 487 (1851).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Roebuck v. Duprey, 2 Ala. 535, 541 (1841) (citing Lessee of Gratz v. Ewalt, 2 Binn. 95
(Pa. 1809)).
240. 2 Blackf. 346 (Ind. 1830).
241. Id. at 347.
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that one of Kent’s decisions was “directly in point . . . as the act of [the] assembly of New-York is the same as ours.”242 The court agreed with Kent that
the statute, though silent on this issue, implied a requirement of good faith.243
The Alabama Supreme Court similarly turned to one of Kent’s opinions for
aid in the interpretation of a statute concerning promissory notes. The court
noted with gratitude that “Chancellor Kent, in his opinion . . . has imparted
both light and order, to the dark and confused mass of adjudication upon this
subject.”244 In a Pennsylvania case interpreting an inheritance statute, the
court also turned to Johnson’s Reporter, noting that the question “has been
deliberately examined in the Court of Errors in New York (where they have
a similar statute).”245 The court relied, in part, on “Chancellor Kent, who has
examined the case with great care, and whose views we adopt” for the conclusion that “a nuncupative will is not good, unless it be made by the testator,
when he is in extremis.”246
Even when courts chose not to rely on Kent, he remained present in their
opinions because lawyers made heavy use of him in their arguments. Because the Commentaries was both convenient and comprehensive, citations
to it frequently dominated lawyers’ briefs. As a result, judges often felt the
need to explain themselves when their conclusions as to the meaning of their
own states’ statutes differed from Kent’s interpretation of similar New York
statutes. In Wilson v. Clarke,247 for example, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania pointed out that New York had retained the fourth section of the British
Statute of Frauds, which explained Chancellor Kent’s conclusion in a case
with similar facts. “But we are enabled to escape [his conclusion],” the court
explained, “by the fact that this section has been omitted in the statute of
Pennsylvania.”248
In Tomlinson’s Lessee v. Devore,249 the question was whether a Maryland statute vested exclusive jurisdiction in chancery over the real estate of
the mentally ill or whether chancery shared jurisdiction with courts of law.
Chancellor Kent had interpreted New York’s statute on this subject to mean
that chancery had exclusive jurisdiction, and his opinion rested on a particular
provision of the New York statute. The Maryland Court of Appeals felt it
necessary to explain that the language of Maryland’s statute was slightly different. “The negative expression in the Statute of New York, the Chancellor

242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Id. at 348.
Id. (citing Jackson ex rel. Gilbert v. Burgott, 10 Johns. 457 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813)).
Bloodgood v. Cammack, 5 Stew. & P. 276, 281 (Ala. 1834).
In re Will of Yarnall, 4 Rawle 46, 64 (Pa. 1833).
Id.
1 Watts & Serg. 554 (Pa. 1841).
Id. at 557.
1 Gill 345 (Md. 1843).

766

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 77:712

construes to confer exclusive jurisdiction, and without this provision, the irresistible inference is, that his jurisdiction would be concurrent with the
courts of common law.”250 Only after distinguishing its case from Kent’s
could the court move on to consider the actual text of the law and hold that
Maryland’s act required a different outcome.251
Whether they wished to or not, when nineteenth-century judges interpreted statutes, they had to contend with Kent—he was there in the courtroom
with them, shaping the possible outcomes the case could take. Kent’s Commentaries, including his substantive teaching on how to interpret statutes in
particular areas of law, became a reference work used in the courts of every
state. It was a text, moreover, with a bent in favor of judicial power to review,
challenge, and mold legislation.
Kent had always opposed codification of law, but when New York’s
legislature made its first moves toward what would culminate in the Field
Code of 1848, Kent greeted the news with equanimity. His influence over
the law, as a drafter of legislation, a defender of the Constitution, and an interpreter of statutes, was quite secure. Even under the most comprehensive
code, he wrote, citizens would find,
“that new and unthought of emergencies often happen that necessarily require new supplements, abatements or explanations” and
that “the body of laws that concern the common justice applicable
to a great [commonwealth] is vast and comprehensive, consists of
infinite particulars and must meet with various emergencies, and
therefore requires much time and much experience as well as much
wisdom and prudence successively to discover defects and inconveniences, and to supply apt supplements and remedies for
them.”252
Where this was true, there was room for what James Wilson had termed
“equity”—for interpretation of the code, just as the earlier statute law had
needed interpretation. Kent could be justly confident that the judges of New
York State would consult his writings first whenever these exigencies arose.
The history of American statutory interpretation would be incomplete
without a chapter on James Kent, even though the place he occupied in New
York’s constitutional structure, poised between the judicial and legislative
250. Id. at 348.
251. Id. at 348–49; see also State v. Granville Alexandrian Soc’y, 11 Ohio 1, 14 (1841) (“We
are also referred to the opinion of Chancellor Kent . . . . That opinion, however, is based, not upon
the charter itself, but upon the decision of the court above referred to. The chancellor, if adjudicating
this case, would, probably, hold that decision obligatory. We do not, for the reasons already
stated.”).
252. JOHN THEODORE HORTON, JAMES KENT: A STUDY IN CONSERVATISM, 1763–1847, at 298
(1969) (alteration in original) (quoting Letter from James Kent to Peter L. Duponceau (Apr. 19,
1826)).
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branches, belongs to a lost world; even though his politics became obsolete
during his lifetime; and even though his high-handed style, the product of his
role in New York’s formative years, was necessarily distinctive. The Commentaries could not have emerged from any other source—they reveal the
meticulousness of the compiler, the experience of the judge, and the vision
and mind of the lifelong legislator. With their constant notation on the proper
interleaving of statutes and common law, the Commentaries became the basic
educational and source text for American lawyers. And Kent’s career, which
began before the turn of the nineteenth century, would have an impact into
the twentieth; Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. edited one of the final editions of
the Commentaries before he took his place on the Supreme Court.253
Kent’s period of statutory interpretation, though brief-lived, had a longterm impact on the development of American law. This is at least in part
because the wariness toward legislatures and statutes that ran throughout
Kent’s work and the work of his peers in other states did not become a fringe
attitude. Even as Kent’s elitist rhetorical phrasings became untenable, and
even as the deference the legislature had showed toward him became a dim
memory, his fundamental orientation toward legislatures remained mainstream. The political rhetoric of Jacksonianism, the first great American populist political movement, maintained the theme that legislatures could be dangerous and, above all, needed direction. Jacksonians maintained a sharp
distinction between “the people,” who would “remain . . . uncorrupted and
incorruptible,” and their representatives, who could be “misle[]d and deceive[d].”254 The executive veto was the first and the favorite Jacksonian
solution to the problem of legislative overreaching, but when this did not
prove sufficient to dam the flow of statutes, Jacksonians turned to what they
saw as its corollary, the interpretation and invalidation of statutes by democratically elected judges.255 And those judges reached for Kent in part because it was easy—Kent provided accessible answers to judges less professionally prepared for their roles, and he was, as we have discussed, already a

253. 1 KENT, supra note 22; see also 2 KENT, supra note 22.
254. 3 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789–1897, at 306
(Washington, 1896). Indeed, Marvin Meyers points out that the seeds of this future Jacksonian
position can be found in the speeches of Kent’s opponents at the 1821 New York Constitutional
Convention. MARVIN MEYERS, THE JACKSONIAN PERSUASION: POLITICS & BELIEF 250 (1960)
(distinguishing between Democratic “radical[s]” at the convention and the “Democratic moderates”
whose positions were not so different from Kent’s and who differed from Kent “mainly by dropping
references to endangered property rights, and by distinguishing more sharply between the virtues of
the people and the vices of their representatives”).
255. See generally JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE’S COURTS: PURSUING
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN AMERICA (2012) (offering a study of the hows, whens, and whys of
judicial elections in the nineteenth century).
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fixture in the lawyers’ arguments—but also because his methods and doctrines about statutes suited the Jacksonian preoccupation with returning
power from the legislatures back to the people.256
V. KENT AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY THEORIES OF INTERPRETATION:
SOME OBSERVATIONS
Kent’s approach to statutes had elements in common with twentiethcentury movements, particularly the teachings of the Legal Process School
of the early twentieth century. Like Hart and Sacks, he would have rejected
the notion that law and society are separate. He frequently eschewed triedand-true English precedents because they did not suit the American context,
sometimes for purely practical reasons but just as often because they failed
to capture the philosophical gains New York had paid for with the Revolution. Kent’s statutory interpretation was also based in what Professors
Eskridge and Frickey describe as “Organic Rationality.”257 That is, as a rationalist, he believed that legal questions could only be answered by reference
to principles that fit into a systematic structure of law, one that was internally
consistent and reasoned. But like John Chipman Gray,258 Roscoe Pound,259
and Benjamin Cardozo,260 Kent believed that the principles motivating legal
commands evolved with society. Indeed, the leading judges of his generation
had to believe this; how else were they to make sense of legislative requests
that they comb through the common law and accept only those aspects of it
suited to the American context?261 And as Lon L. Fuller urged of twentiethcentury jurists,262 Kent believed that the soundness of the policy those principles furthered was just as important as the systematic coherence of the outcome of any particular case.

256. See MEYERS, supra note 254, at 250.
257. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction
to The Legal Process, in HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW lxii (1994).
258. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 286 (1909).
259. ROSCOE POUND, LAW AND MORALS 55 (1924).
260. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 167 (1921) (describing
how “principles that have served their day expire, and new principles are born”).
261. See, e.g., SAMUEL ROBERTS, DIGEST OF SELECT BRITISH STATUTES, COMPRISING THOSE
WHICH, ACCORDING TO THE REPORT OF THE JUDGES OF THE SUPREME COURT MADE TO THE
LEGISLATURE, APPEAR TO BE IN FORCE IN PENNSYLVANIA (Philadelphia, James Kay, Jon &
Brother 1817). This compilation, published by Pennsylvania judges in obedience to a statute passed
by the Pennsylvania Legislature, asked “[t]he judges of the Supreme Court to examine and report,
which of the English Statutes are in force in this Commonwealth;—and which of those Statutes, in
their opinion, ought to be incorporated into the statute laws.” Id. at xiii; see also ELIZABETH
GASPAR BROWN, BRITISH STATUTES IN AMERICAN LAW, 1776–1836, at 29–34 (1964).
262. See LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 10 (1940).
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There were also, of course, striking differences between the way Kent
interpreted statutes and the approach of the Legal Process School, differences
that speak to the realities of judging during the decades just after the Revolution. Legal Process scholars taught, for instance, that the resolution of complex social problems should be left to agencies and legislatures, whose superior fact-finding abilities and capacity for planned regulation would lead to
better, more consistent, and more democratically accountable outcomes. But
any concerns about the comparative competence of institutions of government would have led the lawyers and jurists of Kent’s generation in the opposite direction. As we have seen, Kent’s generation saw what legislatures
did as piecemeal and ad hoc compared to the judicial lawmaking, which, at
the time, more often took into account long-standing traditions and systematic concerns. As such, the consensus of the Legal Process School that judges
should acknowledge their role in the development of policy goals, but that
they should do so as the junior partners to legislatures and agencies, would
not have resonated with Kent or his peers. That aspect of the Legal Process
School depended on the existence of legislatures and agencies of high and
growing institutional capacity. Indeed, the practical difficulty of working
with the legislatures of the early nineteenth century does much to justify the
intuition of Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule that the method of statutory
interpretation should be chosen based on the relative institutional capacities
of the relevant players.263
The most striking difference between Kent’s generation and jurists of
the twentieth century, however, was that Kent’s consideration of the policies
underlying his decisions and inherent in the legal principles he announced
was neither subconscious, nor clandestine, nor something that he needed a
“theory” to justify. He frankly avowed his policy rationales on the face of
his opinions. His jurisprudence is, in this sense, offensive to the wide swath
of twentieth-century legal theories, which have in common their genesis in
the progressive critique of Lochner v. New York264 and the related labor cases.
The motivating concern of twentieth-century legal scholars has been either
how to limit the policymaking function of the judiciary through textualism
and other muzzling doctrines, or how to bring that policymaking out of the
shadows and channel it in ways that pose less of a challenge to democracy.
But this concern over “activist judging” that has motivated post-Lochner
judges and theorists, and to some extent still characterizes the constitutional
law curriculum, is a problem that grows out of that strict separation of powers

263. See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 885, 886–88 (2003); see also Jarrod Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation and the
Evolution of Legislative Drafting, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 807 (2014) (arguing that strict textualism
can only be justified when a legislature has high institutional capacity).
264. 198 U.S. 45 (1905), abrogated by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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that we see as central to republicanism. Kent’s view of “separate powers”
was something that we would not recognize as such. The lines we are used
to, the lines we now depend upon and police as central to the structure of
American constitutionalism, were for the following generation to define.
When Holmes wrote, in The Path of the Law, that “[b]ehind the logical
form” of statutory interpretation decisions “lies a judgment as to the relative
worth and importance of competing legislative grounds, often an inarticulate
and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the very root and nerve of the
whole proceeding,”265 he threw aside a veil that had been drawn over the judicial process for almost a century. Kent’s generation of jurists operated before the veil. This Article should not conclude, however, without some notes
on why the following generation found it necessary to disavow policymaking, and how they did so.
During the Jacksonian era, the American judiciary was forced to redefine itself, now as an integral part of a democratic republican government.
The surge of populism that carried Jackson into the presidency in 1828 signaled the rise of a political party obsessed with democratic legitimacy in government office and deeply suspicious of delegated authority. These trends,
combined with Democrats’ disdain for erudition and their repudiation of the
condescension of an earlier generation’s “natural aristocracy,”266 forced
judges interpreting statutes to find new ways to justify their role in the lawmaking process. At the same time, the great legal controversies of Jackson’s
presidency and the lead-up to the Civil War were more delicate and more
political than ever before. The questions raised in statutory interpretation
cases were existential; they asked courts to decide—to name just two—
whether and to what extent a human subject to the laws was a “person” under
the laws and whether and how much governmental authority could be given
away to private corporations.
So what tools did the judiciary develop to deal with statutes produced
by majoritarian legislatures—statutes that were increasingly dangerous to
construe? Courts managed the problem in two ways. First, they recast legal

265. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 181
(1920).
266. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Oct. 28, 1813), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 394, 396 (1905). Jefferson wrote:
For I agree with you that there is a natural aristocracy among men. The grounds of this
are virtue and talents. . . . The natural aristocracy I consider as the most precious gift of
nature, for the instruction, the trusts, and government of society. And indeed, it would
have been inconsistent in creation to have formed man for the social state, and not to have
provided virtue and wisdom enough to manage the concerns of the society. May we not
even say, that that form of government is the best, which provides the most effectually
for a pure selection of these natural aristoi into the offices of government?
Id.
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questions as questions of institutional power. At the federal level, the judiciary was more a victim of this process than its protagonist. Chief Justice
Roger Taney’s Supreme Court created doctrines that minimized its power in
order to avoid entanglement in the biggest problems of state, an effort that
succeeded until Dred Scott v. Sandford.267 But at the state level, the “Judicial
‘Can’t,’” as Robert Cover called it,268 became not only a mantra but even a
badge of pride.
The second, related way, was by speaking and thinking of jurisprudence
as a science—rather than as a form of governance, which highlights the authority of the judge to make political decisions, or an art, which draws attention to the judge as a personality.269 This was the veil drawn to obscure the
policymaking power of the judiciary, and it involved both a new way of talking about the legal process and a new definition of the judge’s turf. In order
to assert that statutory construction was a science requiring specialized expertise, judges had to take the work of interpreting law away from other institutions, including juries and even legislatures. In the process, equitable
interpretation, and judges’ other more collaborative means of directing statutory innovations, fell away, and judicial review for constitutionality took
their place.270 Judicial review, while more rigid and more authoritarian, was
more acceptable to the new political culture because it represented a claim to
a specialized expertise that legislatures did not share. These moves preserved
a sphere for judicial action that was not poisonous to Jacksonian political
tendencies. Legal “science” does not compete with popular sovereignty, because it posits a law that is rather than a law that does.
The reinvention of judicial authority complemented changes to the legislative branches of the states. In the 1840s and 1850s, some state constitutions were amended to prohibit private, special, and local legislation.271 The
resulting increase in general legislation shifted the administration of whole
swathes of social and economic relations to the courts. Divorces, incorporations, and other legal transactions previously handled case-by-case by the
legislatures were now governed by generally applicable statutes, interpreted
to fit the facts of specific cases by courts. Yet, while delegates to these constitutional conventions spoke of curtailing the discretion of the legislatures,
267. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV.
268. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 119
(1975).
269. See M. H. Hoeflich, Law & Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to Langdell, 30 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 95, 114–16 (1986); Howard Schweber, The “Science” of Legal Science: The Model
of the Natural Sciences in Nineteenth-Century American Legal Education, 17 L. & HIST. REV. 421
(1999).
270. See Farah Peterson, Statutory Interpretation and Judicial Authority, 1776–1860, at 222–47
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation).
271. Id. at 247–59.
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they expressed remarkably little concern over the transfer of that discretion
to the courts. Rather, in testament to the success of the new view of law as
science, the debates show that delegates imagined that they were eliminating
certain types of discretion from government altogether.272 And the change in
legislation gave judges more raw material on which to apply their “scientific”
methods. As statutes focused more on general principles, judges shifted from
the mechanical application of private bills to individuals to the more “lawlike” distillation of rules in particular cases. Although a complete shift to
general legislation did not occur until well after the Civil War, general governing statutes were increasingly common and became the rule in at least
some states.
VI. CONCLUSION
Kent was the most influential of an important generation of American
judges whose impact helps explain the development of American law and
legislation in subsequent years. If Willard Hurst’s claim is right, that later
nineteenth-century judges were able “to take for granted the law’s framework-setting function to an extent that did not do justice to its actual importance,”273 it is only because that frame had already been built before their
time. American law did not fall apart in the nineteenth century—rather, common law legal doctrines were elaborated, explained, and reinforced, building
over time to a more national, rather than state-by-state, American system of
law. Kent’s overview of American law, his influence, along with other members of his generation, on judicial interpretation, and the rise of legal professionalism in the United States more generally, provided both structure for the
legislatures who consulted the texts and precedents and safeguards for those
that did not. The new American treatise writers, including Justice Story, were
part of this evolution, but Kent and other early writers like Swift and De
Saussure were the vanguard. As the next generation of American jurists
turned toward a more “scientific” approach to interpretation, those later jurists found the basic principles of law and discovered the eternal themes of
the law in the materials that Kent’s generation had provided.
Understanding how this first generation of nineteenth-century jurists
bridged what we think of as judicial and legislative roles, one begins to see
how the first century of Americans overcame the central problem of legislation—the problem that arises when non-experts write laws that must interact
with the constitutional rights and common law norms that citizens depend
upon. These great legal minds contributed to a new level of substantive consistency in drafting and interpretation, which would be necessary before
272. Id. at 254.
273. HURST, supra note 4, at 10.
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American legislatures could move beyond piecemeal and private legislation
and toward larger public projects and regulatory acts. Only after this contribution did judges begin to assert lines of demarcation between judicial work
and the legislative prerogative, effectively obscuring the judiciary’s original
role in supplying the substantive norms through which statutes are interpreted.

